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ABSTRACT
MISSION DRIFT AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF RESOURCE DEPENDENCE
THEORY IN AN INTERNALLY RESOURCE-CONSTRAINED ENVIRONMENT
Kirsten Bullock
April 14, 2022
Why are some organizations able to maintain focus on their mission while others
founder? This theoretical and empirical dissertation examines the relationships among
funding sources, management practices, and organizational stigma within an internally
resource-constrained environment. Using Resource Dependence Theory (RDT) as a basis
to manage external resource dependencies, I build a theoretical model and empirically
test a research model to understand how funding source affects mission drift, how
management practices might help organizations manage that drift, and what effect
organizational stigma might have on those relationships within an environment of
internal resource constraints. Specifically, this study hypothesizes that nonprofits that
receive funding from commercial revenue and government funding have a higher
probability of experiencing mission drift than other organizations and that organizational
stigma and management practices proposed by RDT will affect those relationships.
Using a random sample of 8,359 nonprofit tax returns between 2010 and 2021,
representing 961 publicly supported charities, I find no evidence that commercial revenue
or government funding is associated with higher levels of mission drift. In addition, the
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use of management practices and organizational stigma does not appear to have a
statistically significant effect on the incidence of mission drift.
This study contributes to the literature on mission drift in nonprofit organizations,
primarily related to the incidence of and management of mission drift. In addition, it also
begins to explore resource dependency theory in the context of internal resource
constraints. This study also suggests that, contrary to prior findings, commercial revenue
may not result in mission drift in nonprofit organizations.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Why can some nonprofit organizations stay focused on their mission while others
become distracted by other interests? For nonprofit organizations to accomplish the
change they seek to make in the world, they must stay focused on their primary mission,
avoiding mission drift (Jones, 2007; McDonald, 2007; Weisbrod, 2004). Mission drift is
defined as changing its focus from creating social value to creating economic value
(Copestake, 2007; Ebrahim et al., 2014). There are several benefits of staying missionfocused. For instance, nonprofit organizations that remain focused on their mission tend
to have more legitimacy, thereby receiving more funding and positive media attention
(Battilana & Dorado, 2010). Therefore, mission drift would presumably lead to a
reduction in funding and less positive media attention, negatively affecting the ability of
the organization to accomplish its mission.
Nonprofits are increasingly expected to emulate the behavior of professionals in
the commercial sector, challenging the ability of organizations to stay mission-focused
(Sanders & McClellan, 2014), collaborate with other organizations (Omar et al., 2014),
operate transparently (Behn et al., 2010), and work strategically (Bish & Becker, 2016).
Due to time constraints and other internal resource constraints unique to the nonprofit
environment, some organizations drift from their missions (Jones, 2007). Therefore, to
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ensure that organizations stay focused on their primary purpose, it is important to
understand how and under which circumstances mission drift might occur.
Although existing studies have provided valuable insights related to management
practices to manage mission drift, the overall literature provides an unclear understanding
of when and how mission drift occurs (Grimes et al., 2019; Varendh-Mansson et al.,
2020). Overall, having more sources of revenue is thought to decrease the influence of
each group of stakeholders, thereby decreasing the potential of mission drift (Froelich,
1999). However, specific revenue sources are associated with higher levels of mission
drift. For example, results have been inconclusive as to whether commercial revenue
(Civera et al., 2020; Staessens et al., 2019) and government funding (Bennett & Savani,
2011; Berrett & Holliday, 2018) lead to mission drift.
Resource dependence theory (RDT) suggests that organizations can adopt
management practices to limit resource dependencies, such as those introduced by
different revenue sources. For instance, those dependencies can be managed by
developing strong governance practices, professionalization, and lobbying (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978). However, significant internal resource constraints in nonprofit
organizations, such as finances and time (Klyver, Honig, & Steffens, 2018; Shoichet,
1998), may alter these influences.
Many management practices advocated by RDT have been used in studies related
to mission drift. However, most studies only consider aspects of the practices, such as
administrative controls (Battilana et al., 2015) and processes of decision making (Wolf &
Mair, 2019), or simply propose that such relationships likely exist (Ebrahim et al., 2014).
Professionalization in the nonprofit sector has been associated with an increase in the
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incidence of mission drift (Beaton, 2019; Ometto et al., 2019). Moreover, although
scholars have included political action, including lobbying, to manage resource
dependence (Hillman et al., 2009), mission drift literature has not considered whether it
plays a role in helping organizations manage mission drift. Incorporating these variables
into a single study enables examining potential interactions that are not possible when
considered separately.
In addition, this paper considers the role of organizational stigma and its role in
the incidence of mission drift. Organizational stigma can be acquired by serving a
stigmatized population (Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009; Kreiner et al., 2006). On the one
hand, serving a stigmatized population might increase the incidence of mission drift
(Barinaga, 2020; Bullock & Tilley, 2008) due to the temptation of organizational leaders
to water down their mission to attract more funding. On the other hand, it may result in
an organization that can better manage mission drift due to increased commitment to the
mission by staff members and other stakeholders (Tracey & Phillips, 2016). Therefore, I
also consider the role of serving a stigmatized population in this study.
In summary, in this paper, I suggest that specific sources of revenue, including
government funding and commercial revenue, will increase the incidence of mission
drift. In addition, I suggest that, due to internal resource constraints, management
practices advocated by RDT to minimize the influence of resource providers do not
operate the same way within the nonprofit context. Finally, I consider whether
organizational stigma might affect the incidence of mission drift.
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1.1 Research Overview
In this paper, I seek to explore under which circumstances mission drift occurs in
nonprofit organizations by answering three research questions. First, how does funding
source influence mission drift? Second, how do management practices affect the
relationships between funding source and mission drift? Finally, what role does
organizational stigma play in the relationship between funding source and mission drift?
To answer these questions, I propose hypotheses about how funding sources influence
mission drift in the context of internal resource constraints and how management
practices and organizational stigma might moderate those relationships. Definitions for
constructs are provided in Table 1 on page nine.
As with any organization, nonprofits are constrained in the funding available to
invest in organizational activities. Unique to the nonprofit environment is the expectation
that organizations minimize their overhead expenses. For instance, average overhead
expenses for a sample of banks in the United States, including corporate overhead,
technology, consulting, and legal costs, ran almost 49% (Kovner et al., 2014). As a
comparison, the average overhead rate (including those expenses, plus fundraising
expenses and administrative salaries) for a nonprofit organization with a $550,000 budget
is only 12.6% (Lecy & Searing, 2015). This difference in spending habits leads nonprofit
organizations to have higher internal resource constraints than the typical for-profit
corporation.
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Figure 1: Conceptual Model

To understand these influences better, I consider the role funding source might
play in the occurrence of mission drift. Per RDT, a particular funding source's level of
influence depends on both the "relevant magnitude of the exchange and the criticality of
the resource" (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 46). Nonprofit organizations typically choose
multiple funding sources to gain resources to accomplish their goals (Froelich, 1999;
Khieng & Dahles, 2015b). There are several potential funding sources for nonprofit
organizations. Due to both criticality and magnitude of the funding, two sources where
potential influence is most salient include commercial revenue and government funding
(Berrett & Holliday, 2018). Deciding to pursue multiple sources of revenue would,
ostensibly, decrease resource dependencies (Froelich, 1999), leading to a lower incidence
of mission drift. This decrease in mission drift is due to the organization being less reliant
on each funding source and having less need to adapt its programs to achieve funding
goals. For instance, a study with Habitat for Humanity affiliates found that affiliates with
increased diversity in their funding sources provided more housing opportunities for their
clients (Berrett & Holliday, 2018), thereby accomplishing greater mission focus.
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However, the addition of some particular sources of revenue might cause
operational changes within the organization that result in mission drift (Battilana & Lee,
2014; Khieng & Dahles, 2015b). For instance, commercial revenue strategies include
starting and operating a business. While bringing in a business expert can assist in
ensuring the new venture's profitability, the influence of these experts might result in a
shift in priorities that causes mission drift (Froelich, 1999; Weisbrod, 2004). Government
funding also brings potential distractions, as it requires significant time and financial
commitments to manage the application process and reporting requirements (Hwang &
Powell, 2009; Raaijmakers et al., 2015) that might distract the organization from its
primary mission.
Second, I consider ways three different management practices might affect the
relationship between revenue source and mission drift. On the one hand, past research
suggests that formalized management practices should help an organization focus on its
priorities (Hillman et al., 2009). On the other hand, these activities can be at odds with
the internal constraints of the nonprofit environment, leading the organization to become
distracted from its priorities (Khieng & Dahles, 2015b). The management practices I
include are strong governance practices, professionalization, and engaging in lobbying.
Much of the mission drift research has centered on reasons strong governance practices
might lead to better outcomes and a higher focus on the mission. For example, Smith &
Besharov (2019) suggest that organizational infrastructure, such as strong governance
practices, can help organizations avoid mission drift (Logue & Grimes, 2019). Generally,
this infrastructure provides a framework and boundaries within which the organization
must operate to avoid moving too far towards either social or economic goal attainment,
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thereby avoiding mission drift. However, the time investment required to set up strong
governance structures might distract from the organization's mission. Although
researchers have not directly addressed this question in the mission drift literature,
research in the finance literature has suggested having either distracted shareholders
(Kempf et al., 2017) or distracted board members (Masulis & Zhang, 2019) might result
in lower firm performance.
Professionalization is another variable I explore related to managing the
relationship between funding source and mission drift. Within nonprofit literature,
professionalization is defined as the organization having more educated staff instead of
using untrained volunteers (Beaton, 2019). On the one hand, professionalization may help
an organization become less influenced by resource providers (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978),
thereby reducing the possibility of mission drift. However, in a study of a business
incubator in a university environment, the researchers found that the process of scaling
up, including the professionalization of their operations, led to an inability to maintain a
focus on its goals of helping new ventures grow, as well as integrating students actively
in the work of the organization (Ometto et al., 2019).
Lobbying in the nonprofit context is an often-overlooked management practice
that might influence the environment to become more amenable to the firm's interests
(Hillman et al., 2009). This practice is what Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 189, 190) refer to
as 'controlling interdependence through law and social sanction.' For the most part, this
line of research in the nonprofit literature does not appear to explore the outcomes of the
lobbying; instead, it centers on whether nonprofit organizations choose to engage in
lobbying (Hillman et al., 2009; Mitchell, 2014).
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Finally, I consider the role of organizational stigma in the relationship between
funding source and mission drift. Although not formally addressed in the mission drift
literature, prior studies have identified connections between serving individuals who are
stigmatized and mission drift. Goffman (1963) states that a stigma refers to the perception
that an individual's identity is 'spoiled' somehow, which leads others to devalue the
individual. Serving a stigmatized population can result in organizational stigma,
devaluing the organization (Devers et al., 2009). On the one hand, organizational stigma
may result in negative attention in the press (Body & Breeze, 2016). On the other hand,
organizational stigma might also bring about more funding, including partnerships with
other stakeholders who are committed to the needs related to the stigma, thereby reducing
the incidence of mission drift.

In summary, this study aims to bring clarity to the mission drift literature by examining
antecedents of mission drift in the context of internally resource-constrained nonprofit
organizations, particularly related to funding sources. This paper also considers how two key
elements, management practices and organizational stigma, moderate these relationships. I use a
random sample of U.S.-based nonprofit organizations to test these relationships.
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Table 1: Theoretical Definitions and References
Construct

Definition

Reference(s)

Mission Drift

"…losing sight of their social missions in their efforts to generate
revenue."

(Ebrahim et al., 2014, p.
82)

Funding Sources

Funding received from each source
government funding
commercial revenue

(Berrett & Holliday, 2018)

Professionalization

Developing new managerial capabilities

(Sanzo-Pérez et al., 2017)

Strong Governance
Practices

Strong governance practices have emerged from best practices
advocated by national governance training programs such as
BoardSource and watchdog groups such as GuideStar (now Candid)
and the Better Business Bureau (Standard 1) as a way to ensure that
the board of directors fulfills their oversight role, part of which is to
ensure that the organization stays focused on the mission of the
organization.

("BBB Standards for
Charity Accountability,"
n.d.; "Oversight and
Accountability BoardSource," n.d.)

Lobbying

Using political activity to influence the environment so that it
becomes more amenable to the firm's interests (Hillman et al., 2009).
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 189, 190) refer to this as 'controlling
interdependence through law and social sanction.'

(Hillman et al., 2009;
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978)

Organizational
Stigma

"…a label that evokes a collective stakeholder group-specific
perception that an organization possesses a fundamental, deep-seated
flaw that deindividuates and discredits the organization."

(Devers et al., 2009)
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1.2 Anticipated Contributions
There are three primary theoretical contributions I hope to make with this
dissertation. The first is to consider RDT in the context of internal resource constraints.
The second is to investigate more directly the role of organizational stigma in RDT. My
third anticipated contribution is to begin moving towards a theory of mission drift.
RDT and Management Practices in a Context with Significant Internal
Resource Constraints. RDT suggests that management practices, such as lobbying,
professionalization, and strong governance practices, will result in greater autonomy and
better ability to achieve higher levels of firm performance. However, nonprofit
organizations operate in an environment with significant internal resource constraints
(Kim & Peng, 2018; Svensson et al., 2015), brought on primarily by underinvestment in
administration and oversight (Lecy & Van Slyke, 2013; Sargeant & Day, 2018). Prior
research has been inconclusive as to whether these management practices are associated
with an increased probability of mission drift. Indeed, researchers have found that these
practices might also cause the organization to lose its focus on its primary mission,
resulting in lower levels of social mission attainment (Ometto et al., 2019). This study
seeks to begin to reconcile these apparent contradictions and may clarify the effect of
internal resource constraints on relationships outlined by RDT.
Organizational stigma. An assumption made by Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) make
is that the goals and purposes of an organization must be deemed 'of worth' to the larger
system within which it operates. Organizations that serve the needs of stigmatized
individuals may not meet that assumption (Hampel & Tracey, 2017). Furthermore,
although scholars have hypothesized about outcomes of organizational stigma (Devers et
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al., 2009), little empirical research related to outcomes has been conducted. Therefore,
this study takes steps to fill this gap by considering whether RDT might still be relevant
in the case of organizational stigma.
Towards a theory of mission drift. Articles on mission drift have pulled from
institutional theory (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Civera et al., 2020), resource dependence
(Henderson & Lambert, 2018), the life cycle perspective (Mia et al., 2019), paradox
theory (Zheng et al., 2020), and an identity perspective (Grimes et al., 2019). Although
mission drift has been studied, there is no consensus regarding a general theory of causes
and management strategies for mission drift. For instance, while individual management
practices from RDT have been proposed and tested, there do not appear to be any studies
that attempt to comprehensively test RDT in relation to mission drift. Mitchell (2014)
found that nonprofits engaged in management practices from RDT in response to
resource dependencies, and while his research did not extend to outcomes such as
mission drift, he suggested that could be a fruitful avenue for further study. Through this
study, I hope to contribute to this growing stream of literature.

1.3 Structure
This dissertation will continue as follows. Chapter 2 provides a literature review
covering mission drift; Chapter 3 focuses on the theoretical development of the model
and the hypotheses to be tested in this study, specifically the application of RDT in the
nonprofit sector and in the case of organizational stigma. Chapter 4 outlines the
methodology followed in this study, including operationalizing the variables of interest
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and outlining the steps to test the hypotheses. Chapter 5 presents the results, and Chapter
6 discusses the findings, limitations of the study, and ideas for future research.

1.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter began by introducing the primary goal of this study, exploring which
management practices are most effective in preventing mission drift resulting from
influences from funding sources in nonprofit organizations. The three management
practices include strong governance practices, professionalization, and lobbying. In
addition, organizational stigma is suggested as a context that might affect mission drift.
Next, the chapter covered the theoretical basis for the hypotheses in this study at a high
level. The contributions section included some anticipated contributions this dissertation
might make to the literature. Section 1.3 provides an overview of the structure for the
remainder of the proposal.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Chapter Overview
Section 2.2 defines mission drift. Next, Section 2.3 explores RDT and outlines
why it is an appropriate framework for my study. Section 2.4 provides an overview of the
causes of mission drift. Section 2.5 explores potential ways organizations might choose to
manage mission drift. Next, Section 2.6 explores ways organizational stigma might affect
the relationship between commercial revenue and mission drift. Finally, section 2.7
closes out this chapter.

2.2 Mission Drift
There is an inconsistent view of mission drift and a lingering question of whether
the inclusion of 'drift' in mission drift might be a misnomer. One of the earliest uses of
the term 'mission drift' in the popular press appears to have occurred in 1992 when
technical schools in the U.K. referred to themselves as universities. Since that time, the
vast number of theoretical and operational definitions is likely due, at least in part, to the
wide range of disciplines that have explored mission drift, including economics,
entrepreneurship, nonprofit and public policy, and medicine. Therefore, this section will
clarify the construct of mission drift by reviewing its definitions.
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Although many articles do not explicitly define mission drift, four general ideas
emerged from a review of the literature. Although mission drift includes the word 'drift,'
which implies an unintentional change over time, most definitions of mission drift do not
include that same implication. The most general definition relates to investing time,
energy, or money on activities unrelated to the organization's stated mission (Jones,
2007). However, scholars have typically operationalized this in one of two different
ways. The first view attempts to determine whether activities are social or commercial. If
the organization opts to engage in more commercial-oriented activities, they are said to
have drifted (Copestake, 2007). The second operationalization typically looks more
generally at a change in programs or organization type (Ebrahim et al., 2014; Jaquette,
2013; Mersland & Strøm, 2010). A recent conceptualization of mission drift in the
management literature is that mission drift is more of a perception issue the organization
needs to manage than an objective reality (Grimes et al., 2019).
General definition. The most general definition of mission drift emerged from
the nonprofit literature, where scholars defined it as moving away from the organization's
stated mission by expending time, energy, or money on activities unrelated to its mission
(Jones, 2007). Several subsequent studies adopted this definition (D'Espallier, Hudon, &
Szafarz, 2017; Henderson & Lambert, 2018; Kwong, Tasavori, & Wun-mei Cheung,
2017; Robb & Robinson, 2014). Similarly, Cetindamar and Ozkazanc‐Pan (2017) speak
to a disconnect between the organization's stated mission (ends) and the activities in
which the organization engages (means), in that the activities of the organization are not
consistent with the stated mission. Other related definitions include a general shift in
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mission (Ometto et al., 2019) or something that threatens the organization's very reason
for being (Logue & Grimes, 2019).
In contrast, as illustrated in Figure 2, the ways scholars have operationalized
mission drift may not capture what the definition implies. For instance, a binary choice of
creating social versus commercial value (Hestad et al., 2020) does not allow for goals that
help the organization create both types of value. Also, changes in programs may help the
organization better meet its stakeholders' needs (Bennett & Savani, 2011). The following
sections will explore each of these definitions of mission drift.
Figure 2. Definitions of mission drift

Change in emphasis (social versus economic). Several scholars have defined
mission drift as simply shifting from creating social value to focusing on generating a
profit (Beisland, D'Espallier, & Mersland, 2019; Copestake, 2007; Ebrahim et al., 2014;
Xu, Copestake, & Peng, 2016). This view is prevalent in both the nonprofit and the
microfinance literature. This characteristic assumes that commercial and social interests
are incompatible (Weisbrod, 2004) due to the difference in operating styles and
motivations between the two activities (Civera et al., 2020). However, this also assumes
that the activities that create economic and social value are separate, which is not always
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the case. The two goals might be complementary in some situations, as in integrated
hybrid organizations, where commercial and social activities are the same (Battilana &
Lee, 2014; Ebrahim et al., 2014). For instance, the Girl Scouts, an organization that seeks
to create social value, also has a commercial interest in selling cookies. While, on the
surface, these activities might seem unrelated, the Girl Scouts see participation in this
activity as teaching life skills such as responsibility, goal setting, and business principles
(Atkin, 1990; Goerisch & Swanson, 2015). In these cases, the organization integrates the
economic and social goals.
Change in programs / type. The third perspective of mission drift suggests a
change in the types of clients the organization serves (Mersland & Strøm, 2010). Most of
the papers using this operationalization are in the microfinance literature and specifically
refer to moving from serving clients who are poor in favor of those clients who have
more wealth (Aubert et al., 2009; Caserta et al., 2018; Gutiérrez-Nieto et al., 2016; Mia et
al., 2019; Mia & Lee, 2017). A shift towards larger loans results in higher efficiencies, as
fewer loans are needed to lend an equal amount of funding, resulting in higher
profitability (Ault, 2016). Studies have operationalized this type of mission drift as (1) an
increase in average loan size (D'Espallier et al., 2017; Fan, John, Liu, & Tamanni, 2019;
Mersland & Strøm, 2010), (2) giving fewer loans to women (D'Espallier, Hudon, et al.,
2017; Mersland & Strøm, 2010), or (3) moving away from group lending (where
individuals are placed in a group and are accountable for each other's loans) (Pedrini &
Ferri, 2016).
Similar to a change in programs, other scholars have operationalized mission drift
as entities transforming from one type to another. For instance, a paper from the
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educational literature explores a college transitioning to a university (Jaquette, 2013).
D'Espallier and associates (2017) follow an institutional transformation from a
nongovernmental organization to a for-profit entity with shareholders as a type of mission
drift within a microfinance setting.
Mission drift as a perception. Finally, scholars have suggested that mission drift
is simply a perception issue that the organization needs to manage (Grimes et al., 2019)
rather than an objective reality. In this perspective, mission drift might present itself as a
discontinuity between how an organization presents itself or its behavior, as viewed by
stakeholders or the general public (Grimes et al., 2019). Another paper suggests that
mission drift occurs when there is a conflict between an identity claim and the
organization's behavior, as perceived by stakeholders (Saqib, 2019). The third paper that
references perceptions indicates that although one community might construe an
organization's behavior as mission drift, it might not be the case in other communities
(Rychert & Wilkins, 2020).
What about strategic decisions? Is there a difference between mission drift and
strategic shifts an organization might make? Bennett and Savani (2011) found that, in
many cases, the 'mission drift' that occurred was seen internally as a strategic choice by
charity leaders. The goals of this strategic choice included expanding services and taking
advantage of newly available government funding. Strategic shifts and mission drift may
have overlapping characteristics (Chu & Luke, 2012). In preparation for this study, I
interviewed executives from community health centers to ask for their perspectives
regarding mission drift. All three of the health centers these executives represented had
experienced significant changes in services, including:
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A health center founded as a nonprofit, transitioned to a for-profit, and
then converted back to a nonprofit



A health center started a food pantry and professional attire program



A health center started as an all-volunteer ministry and transitioned into
using paid staff and began charging their patients fees (on a sliding fee
scale)

None of these executives felt they had experienced mission drift. They shared that
these were strategic choices to serve their patient populations better. However, based on
academic literature, these changes would likely be considered mission drift. Although
this may seem problematic, Grimes and associates (2019) suggest that creating a
delineation between strategic shifts and mission drift may be unnecessary due to the
following:


Unintentional outcomes may result from intentional acts; just because a
change is intentional does not mean that it will not result in drift



Strategic change may not be intentional, or leaders may only interpret the
changes as intentional after the fact

These ideas imply a conceptual overlap between mission drift and strategic shifts,
as an organization could make a strategic decision that moves them further from its stated
mission.
Outcomes of mission drift. Regardless of the definition used to describe mission
drift, the question remains whether mission drift is good, bad, or neutral. The verdict, it
appears, is still out. In the nonprofit and social entrepreneurship literature, many scholars
assume that mission drift, whether it be a change in programs or a shift from focusing on
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creating social value to generating economic value, is a negative outcome, as it draws
attention away from what they believe is the 'true' work of the organization (Civera et al.,
2020; Kwong et al., 2017; Weisbrod, 2004). Other scholars find that organizations grow
stronger and improve social value creation by focusing on economic outcomes. For
example, Flemish sheltered workshops increased the number of clients they placed in
positions as well as revenue earned from their programs (Staessens et al., 2019). Other
research has indicated that accepting funding for new programs can enhance services for
existing clients (Bennett & Savani, 2011). These findings suggest that focusing on
economic and social returns should not be a dichotomous relationship.
Using mission statements to reconceptualize mission drift. As definitions of
mission drift address different components of a mission, it might be useful to break down
mission drift into multiple components, such as has been done in the literature related to
mission statements (Pearce & David, 1987). Based on their analysis of mission
statements for Fortune 500 companies, Pearce and David (1987) identified several
attributes businesses typically include in mission statements. These include several
components related to customers, products or services, geography, key technologies,
commitment to survival or profitability, philosophy, self-concept, and the organization's
desired public image. The themes that have been most prevalent in the mission drift
literature have included changes in products or customers and philosophy (focus on
economic versus social value). Therefore, I attempt to capture mission drift based on the
value orientation of the missions statement, that is, whether it is more focused on
accomplishing social or economic goals.
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2.3 Resource Dependence Theory
Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) theorized that an interdependence exists between the
environment and organizations that need resources from external sources. As
organizations rely on financial and human resources from their environment, they are
likely to be influenced by their environment. RDT suggests this is due to an assumption
that those making decisions on behalf of the receiving organization are aware of these
interdependencies and take the resource providers' desires into account when deciding
how to manage the firm (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). According to the theory,
organizations can manage these external forces' influence by exerting agency through
five different categories of management practices (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The first
category relates to managing environmental demands through adaptation and avoidance
of demands placed on them, primarily through board-driven activities. The second
category involves 'controlling the context of control' by engaging in management
practices to manage or avoid independence (e.g., growth/mergers/acquisitions). The third
is to establish 'collective structures of inter-organizational action' by engaging in joint
ventures or other partnerships. Next is to control 'interdependence through law and social
sanction' by finding ways to affect the environment, such as through lobbying. The final
management practice involves being intentional regarding executive succession. These
are outlined in Table 2. Research using RDT has centered on boards, lobbying, joint
ventures, controlling the context of control (mergers/vertical integrations), and executive
succession (Hillman et al., 2009). In summary, RDT attempts to integrate both an
institutional perspective while recognizing the agency organizations hold when
interfacing with their environment (Wry et al., 2013).
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While early researchers focused on the strategic choice of ways to manage
external influences, recent research has extended this to exploring outcomes, most
commonly financial performance, of various organizational reactions to environmental
influences (Hillman et al., 2009; Wry et al., 2013).
Table 2: Literature Review Overview
Causes of Mission Drift
(derived from the literature review)

Management Practices
(per RDT)

Resource importance
 Availability of alternative sources
 Increasing Costs
 Decreasing revenues






Discretion over use
 Influence by funders (direct & indirect)
 Different payor & beneficiary
 Internal stakeholders

Included in RDT, but not applied to the
nonprofit context:
 Mergers/vertical integration
 Executive succession

Boards
Growth*
Lobbying
Joint ventures

Internal Resource Constraints
* Growth is included by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) but not by Hillman and associates (2009).

2.4 Causes of Mission Drift
Influences from the external environment can cause organizations to drift from
their missions. RDT suggests that the level of influence the external environment has on
organizations is related to the importance of the resource and the amount of discretion the
organization has in expending its resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The importance
of the resource relates to its relative magnitude and how critical that resource is for the
organization's operations. Discretion over use relates to how free the organization is to
decide how to use its resources. In addition, I consider internal resource constraints as an
additional cause of mission drift.
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2.4.1 Resource importance
Alternative sources of revenue. Having alternative sources of revenue can help
organizations feel less beholden to the funding provider. Two studies illustrate this point.
The first study is based on a 15-year longitudinal panel. The researchers found that
hybrid organizations organized as for-profit ventures were more likely than those
organized as nonprofits to drift from their original mission, as measured by increased
loans to wealthier clients (Ault, 2016). The logic behind this is that the high costs of
building an infrastructure that supports inclusivity drives commercial ventures to seek
alternative ways to increase revenue. On the other hand, nonprofit ventures have
presumably built an alternative revenue stream that will help to support those costs.
The second study (Xu et al., 2016) is primarily about the impact of institutional
forces on microfinance institutions (MFIs). However, it also supports the premise that the
availability of funding affects mission drift in that it finds that an increase in available
funding decreases mission drift, as measured by average loan balance. The availability of
multiple funding providers appears to have led to a decrease in mission drift among MFIs
(Xu et al., 2016).
Increasing costs. If costs increase significantly, then the importance of all
funding sources will increase, thereby also increasing external influences. An early study
regarding mission drift (Mersland & Strøm, 2010) did not find evidence of mission drift
within the MFIs they studied. However, they found that average loan size (a frequent
indicator for mission drift) increased when costs per client increased. This finding may
indicate that resource constraints (such as cost per client) necessitated expansion to
higher average loans to ensure the sustainability of the MFI. A comparative study
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(between drifted and non-drifted MFIs) also finds that high average costs per client can
negatively affect the sustainability of an MFI, leading to higher interest rates and fees to
clients, which are counter to the social mission of those MFIs (Serrano-Cinca &
Gutiérrez-Nieto, 2014). An international study of 1,151 MFIs from 104 different
countries also found that, while average loan size might remain low, MFIs often choose
to raise interest rates and fees to cover the higher expenses associated with micro loans
(D'Espallier, Hudon, et al., 2017). All three of these studies indicate that constrained
resources might affect mission drift.
Decreasing revenues. One study explored transitions from a college to a
comprehensive university (Jaquette, 2013). The author investigated the impact of
institutional (previously integrating curricula commonly used by the comprehensive
university model), market (declining enrollments), and network factors. She found that all
three of these factors led to an increase in the college's probability of becoming a
university. This finding indicates that declining enrollments, or decreasing revenues,
were partially responsible for what the author defined as mission drift (transitioning from
one type of organization to another).

2.4.2 Discretion over Use
There are many factors in the nonprofit context that might limit the organization's
discretion over the use of funding. Some of these include the funder's influence,
separation of payor and recipient of services, and influence of internal stakeholders.
Influence by funders. A qualitative research study within the UK's and Italy's
food and beverage industry found that funders' conflicting demands increased the
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incidence of mission drift (Civera et al., 2020). These conflicts are explained using the
institutional logics perspective and highlight the differences in worldviews between pure
social or pure commercial interests of hybrid organizations that choose to register as
either for-profit or nonprofit enterprises. Within the nonprofit literature, it is evident that
large donors can influence decision-making related to the organization's mission (Bennett
& Savani, 2011; Henderson & Lambert, 2018), potentially resulting in mission drift. This
mission drift might be a result of direct influences. For example, Yetman & Yetman
(2009) found that nonprofits tend to pursue taxable revenue only when existing funding
providers are less averse to taxable revenue. A study within the context of venture capital
firms found that the power of financial stakeholders affects how the venture capital firm
chooses to invest, regardless of the fund's stated mission (Cetindamar & Ozkazanc‐Pan,
2017); specifically, the investors were primarily driven by anticipated financial returns
from the projects rather than by social outcomes.
However, the influences may be indirect as well. A study of four mid-sized
charities in the U.K. found that funders have the potential to affect mission drift (Bennett
& Savani, 2011). Interestingly, the mechanism for this influence was not directly from
funders but indirectly through changes to the charities' accounting and information
systems. The funders did not dictate those changes, but the organization needed to update
its systems to meet reporting requirements. The new reports (initially developed for
funders) replaced reports that the organization's governing body had previously used to
make strategic decisions, thereby indirectly influencing the charities' decisions. These
changes are what appeared to result in mission drift.
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Separation of payor and recipient. Other researchers have suggested that
whether the beneficiaries and the payors are different might predict the occurrence of
mission drift (Santos et al., 2015). Identifying whether the payor and the beneficiary are
the same is based on the potential conflict of identifying and maintaining two separate
and distinct markets. For instance, in a food bank, one market receives services (a family
receiving food), while the other market covers the price (a foundation or other donor).
The hybrid organization, in this case, will need to balance the demands of both
stakeholder groups while having the temptation to alter the services provided based on
the requirements of the primary funder.
Internal stakeholders. One line of research from the microfinance literature
related to mission drift is the impact individuals within the organizations have on mission
drift. Individual characteristics relate to the loan officers' background and level of
experience and where decision-making authority lies within the organization. First, one
study explored whether the career backgrounds of loan officers would affect the amount
of funding lent to poorer borrowers, even as the microfinance business grew. As
evidenced by lending patterns, they found that organizations avoided mission drift when
the loan officers had previously been farmers or worked in local government (Jia et al.,
2016). Second, as the experience level of the credit officer increases, the number of
vulnerable clients they serve (as evidenced by loan size and clients who are young or
have a disability) appears to decrease (Beisland et al., 2019). The authors of this
particular study concluded that this might be due to the loan officer's desire for increased
efficiency, leading them to seek out clients for larger loans. Related to this, when field
staff decides which clients to serve and when the organization gives incentives for

25

increased revenue, drift in practices may occur (Maitrot, 2019). This drift might be due to
employees prioritizing their potential incentives over the organization's mission. These
adjustments in the individual decisions and practices lead to an overall drift in the
organization's mission.

2.4.3 Internal Resource Constraints
Although RDT places a significant emphasis on external resource constraints (due
to the availability of external resources being limited), it does not appear to address
internal resource constraints. The management practices to limit external influences that
RDT suggests can often require a significant investment in time and other organizational
influences. If available internal resources are constrained, then both the organization's
ability to adopt management practices from RDT and the impact of adopting those
practices might be different within organizations with internal resource constraints. This
difference in available resources may help to explain the lack of consistent findings
related to RDT within the nonprofit context (Hodge & Piccolo, 2005).
Prior research studies agree that nonprofit organizations operate with significant
internal resource constraints (Foster & Meinhard, 2002; Kim & Peng, 2018; Shoichet,
1998). A study related to service-learning found (in post interviews with staff from the
participating nonprofits) that resource constraints hindered the ability of nonprofit
organizations to integrate student volunteers into their work (Bushouse, 2005). Within
sports development organizations, constraints such as limited funding and poor
organizational structures were obstacles to accomplishing organizational goals (Svensson
et al., 2015).
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However, most studies of RDT within the nonprofit context do not appear to
consider internal resource constraints or only mention them in passing. For instance, a
study on revenue diversity within housing nonprofits raises the issue of internal factors.
However, the authors limit the measurements of internal factors to characteristics of
external funders (Shea & Wang, 2016) rather than considering issues such as limited
staffing or funding within the nonprofit itself. Although Malatesta and Smith (2014)
mention that the nonprofit context is internally resource-constrained, they do not address
how those internal resource constraints might affect the ability of organizations to
implement management practices suggested by RDT. Despite this, they recommend ways
for nonprofit organizations to implement tactics suggested by RDT.

2.5 Management of Mission Drift
As outlined in section 2.3, Hillman and associates (2009) suggest five primary
ways organizations might limit external influences. These include boards, lobbying,
mergers, joint ventures, and executive succession. Another management practice included
in Pfeffer and Salancik's (1978) original work is growth, as larger organizations can
withstand influence better than smaller organizations. In this literature review, I have
attempted to connect these management practices from RDT with strategies from the
literature related to managing mission drift. As I did not find any literature related to
mission drift and mergers, lobbying, and executive succession, this review focuses on
boards, growth, and joint ventures.
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2.5.1 Boards
While boards and governance have played a principal role in both RDT and
mission drift research, recent research on boards and RDT appears to focus primarily on
large companies. For in-depth reviews of RDT and boards, see Hillman et al. (2009) or
Wry et al. (2013). Research in this stream has included considerations such as board size,
board composition, the role the environment plays, and changing needs over the life cycle
of the business (Hillman et al., 2009). The mission drift literature focuses on three aspects
of boards, including board activities, board structure, and individual leaders.
Related to board activities, Salancik, Wolf & Mair (2019) refer to both external
influences that control organizations, as well as the agency of the organization to
proactively manage these influences, both of which are core aspects of resource
dependence theory. The authors suggest that organizations can manage mission drift by
incorporating certain activities into the organization – both in governing body and in the
organization's activities. These include focusing on the organization's purpose,
committing to the activities that advance that purpose, and continually achieving small
wins. Other studies focus on setting goals to ensure the organization does not abandon
one goal at the expense of others (Mason & Doherty, 2016) or reduce its commitment to
achieving its goals (Wolf & Mair, 2019). These findings suggest that governing boards
have several tools available to help manage mission drift.
Other research has focused on board structure. Several researchers (Battilana &
Lee, 2014; Doherty et al., 2014; Ebrahim et al., 2014) have explored how organizations
pursue multiple goals and yet still avoid mission drift. For example, Smith and Besharov
(2019) suggest that 'bumping against guardrails,' or setting exterior boundaries related to
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financial and commercial activities is helpful. Mission drift scholars also address
governance-related topics such as planning (Ebrahim et al., 2014; Tantalo & Priem, 2016;
Wolf & Mair, 2019) and administrative controls (Battilana et al., 2015; Ebrahim et al.,
2014; Mason & Doherty, 2016). Some scholars have addressed 'spaces of negotiation'
(Battilana et al., 2015). These dedicated times are committed to discussing issues that
might draw the organization to conflicting aspects of its mission.
Other board structure-related mechanisms in the literature include monitoring,
control, accountability (Ebrahim et al., 2014), and flexible budgeting (Mason & Doherty,
2016). These governance-related mechanisms appear to be effective at helping
organizations avoid mission drift under the circumstances in the studies. Some
organizations are intentional about the people they choose to be part of their board,
seeking to include representatives familiar with their different goals (Battilana et al.,
2015). Other studies focus on different participants' skills (Mason & Doherty, 2016).

2.5.2 Growth
There are several ways that organizations might choose to grow. In the nonprofit
sector, byproducts of this growth often include diversifying funding sources and the
professionalization of the organization's workforce.
Diversification. Researchers have theorized that diversifying funding sources can
decrease dependencies on a given funding provider (Froelich, 1999), which should, in
theory, lead to a lower incidence of mission drift. A study with Habitat for Humanity
affiliates found that affiliates with increased diversity in their funding sources provided
more housing opportunities for their clients (Berrett & Holliday, 2018), thereby
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accomplishing greater mission focus. A study in the food and beverage industry in Italy
and the United Kingdom also found support for the premise that diversifying revenues
can help organizations avoid mission drift (Civera et al., 2020). Transnational NGOs also
have been found to use diversifying revenue to manage resource dependencies (Mitchell,
2014). A leader of a human rights NGO reflected on how diversified revenue helped
them be more financially stable:
We were initially funded entirely by foundations and the revenue base has
been diversified over the years. ... The challenge for us is that foundations
often have very narrowly construed program criteria. A diversified
funding base is always safer. Foundation flows go up and down with
economic conditions and the flavor of the month. Climate change had
almost disappeared as a foundation issue two or three years ago. Now it's
the flavor of the month. Everybody wants to fund it. Other things that
were hot two or three years ago have now disappeared. So the nice thing
about individual donors is that they will often provide general support.
(Mitchell, 2014, p. 78)
Professionalization. Following nonprofit literature, I define professionalization
as developing "new managerial capabilities" (Sanzo-Pérez et al., 2017, p. 1597). Prior
research has found that mission drift becomes more likely when the organization begins
to seek paid, paid staff that replaces untrained volunteers (Beaton, 2019). On the one
hand, some research has indicated that professionalization should help organizations stay
focused on their primary goals, as formalization and professionalization might lead to
overly constraining the organization's work through layers of bureaucracy (Adler &
Borys, 1996), limiting the ability to change. Professionalization may also provide a
framework for building a venture that is less influenced by funding sources (Suykens et
al., 2019). On the other hand, in a study of a business incubator in a university
environment, the researchers found that the process of scaling up, including the need to
formalize its operations and recruit paid staff, led to an inability to maintain a focus on its
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goals of helping new ventures grow and integrating students actively in the work of the
organization (Ometto et al., 2019).

2.5.3 Joint ventures
Network factors, including joint ventures, can play both a positive and a negative
role in causing mission drift. For instance, on the positive side, Ometto and associates
(2019) suggest that including ways to connect with the institutional environment (what
they refer to as herding spaces) can help avoid mission drift by reinforcing the
importance of each of the competing worldviews under which the organization is
operating. On the other hand, when power between funders or partners becomes
unbalanced, the influence of the partners or funders may lead to mission drift. For
instance, Saqib (2019) found a disconnect between the identity understanding and the
identity claim of two Pakistani organizations following an increase in the power of key
stakeholders. Similarly, another study that investigated power and potential mission drift
occurred in the context of social enterprises engaging in partnerships in the UK (Kwong
et al., 2017). They found that mission drift was more likely to occur when power
asymmetries within the partnership were higher. These findings suggest that networks
may influence mission drift.
In this paper, I propose to study mission drift within nonprofit organizations
through the lens of RDT, as mission drift, based on my review of the literature, appears to
be subject to both influences of and management strategies for mission drift.
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2.6 The Case of Organizational Stigma
In this section, I will (1) define organizational stigma and how it relates to
nonprofit organizations, (2) consider the ways organizational stigma might strain the
resources of the organization, and (3) suggest that organizational stigma might result in
stakeholders that are more committed to the organization.

2.6.1 Defining and Understanding Organizational Stigma
Three types of conditions might lead an individual to be considered stigmatized,
including having a physical deformity, tribal associations (e.g., gender, religion, or race),
and those associated with conduct (e.g., crime) (Devers et al., 2009; Goffman, 1963). An
organization may also become stigmatized due to its association with stigmatized
individuals. Scholars have defined organizational stigma as "a label that evokes a
collective stakeholder group-specific perception that an organization possesses a
fundamental deep-seated flaw that deindividuates and discredits the organization"
(Devers et al., 2009). The focus of academic research in this area appears to be primarily
on identifying types of stigmas placed on organizations (typically based on conduct or
'tribal' affiliations, such as country of origin), approaches to prevent or remove the
stigmas, or how prevalent the stigma might be (Devers et al., 2009). The idea that
nonprofits might become stigmatized developed out of work completed by Body and
Breeze (2016), in which they identified causes that were less popular in the press. These
'unpopular causes' served stigmatized populations, such as individuals seeking mental
health assistance, offenders and ex-offenders, those with HIV/AIDS, and those addicted
to drugs or alcohol. A later related study (Jeong, 2020) connected the idea of unpopular
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causes to stigmatized causes in an article that explored engagement in cause campaigns
on social media on behalf of socially stigmatized causes.

2.6.2 Organizational Stigma and Mission Drift
Whether organizational stigma affects the incidence of mission drift is not clear.
Associating with a stigmatized population may bring negative press, but
counterintuitively, it may also result in more opportunities for partnerships with other
stakeholders. For instance, a social enterprise in the U.K. gained negative attention in the
press after adding services for a migrant population (Tracey & Phillips, 2016). While its
reputation suffered among some stakeholders, other organizations with a social purpose
aligned with that of the organization thought positively about the shift. These
stakeholders included organizations at the national level and government commissions.
In this case, rather than causing organizational leaders to change their programs, the
negative attention increased commitment to serving the stigmatized population.
Organizational stigma may, however, result in higher levels of mission drift.
Barinaga (2020) uses a case study to explore an incidence of mission drift in a
stigmatized area of an urban city in Sweden. The study's primary focus was on a power
differential between two entities seeking to improve the area and how that led to an
increase in mission drift. City leaders were most interested in decreasing criminal activity
in the neighborhood, while the community center was most interested in elevating
residents' voices. Due primarily to the location the city provided for the venture and the
gang activity near the location, they were drawn into a dispute with local gang members,
who were not interested in sharing a corner with the community center. After gang
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members attacked the community center, the situation forced community center officials
to focus on reducing crime (rather than their primary mission). Although a power
differential is a reasonable explanation for the mission drift, it might also be that working
on behalf of a stigmatized group increased that power differential even more, thereby
leading to a higher likelihood of mission drift due to influence from a funding source.
A study about a gun violence prevention program in the U.K. documented how
the organization transformed into a general youth services program. The organization
initially based its approach on a successful intervention program to decrease gang activity
(Bullock & Tilley, 2008). Their focus shifted multiple times: first to address individual
gang members directly, next to identify social determinants of entry into a gang, and
finally to prevent entry into a gang by creating an after-school program to keep at-risk
youth (loosely defined) occupied. The article indicates that the latter shift was primarily
due to the stigma attached to gang membership. This finding might indicate that when
organizational stigma is involved, there may be an increased likelihood of mission drift
due to the need to make the organization's goals more palatable for key stakeholders.

2.7 Chapter Summary
This chapter has provided an overview of the literature related to mission drift,
integrated with resource dependence theory. Section 2.2 provided background related to
mission drift. Then, Section 2.3 provided an overview of RDT and the reasoning as to
why it provides a useful framework through which to study mission drift. Next, Section
2.4 explored some resource-related causes of mission drift, including how vital the
resource is, how much discretion/ownership the organization has over the resource, and
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whether internal resource constraints exist. Section 2.5 addressed ways to manage
mission drift, including work that boards might accomplish, growth, and joint ventures.
Then Section 2.6 discussed organizational stigma and whether that might also affect the
relationship between funding source and mission drift.
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CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES

3.1 Chapter Overview
The previous chapter reviewed the literature on mission drift and explored how
RDT might be relevant as an overarching theory through which to understand mission
drift better. Specifically, it explored both the role of external influences through the
provision of resources and management practices to address those influences. This
chapter develops a theoretical model that proposes ways firms can manage resource
dependencies, thereby better managing mission drift. Specifically, I explore the roles that
government funding and commercial revenue have on mission drift and how three
management practices from RDT (strong governance practices, professionalization of the
staff, and lobbying) might affect mission drift. I also explore how organizational stigma
might affect mission drift due to government funding and commercial revenue.

3.2 The Research Model
As discussed in chapter two, many of the findings related to the causes of mission
drift have been inconclusive. However, much of the research indicates that mission drift
is often a result of external influences on organizations (Civera et al., 2020). Due to the
influence of external forces on mission drift, specifically government and commercial
revenue, I suggest that resource dependence theory (RDT) is an appropriate lens to
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explore mission drift. This paper considers the moderating effect of management
practices from RDT and organizational stigma on the relationship between funding and
mission drift. The management practices include boards (strong governance practices),
growth (operationalized as the professionalization of the staff), and lobbying. The other
aspects of RDT, specifically joint ventures, mergers/vertical integrations, and executive
succession, are not considered in this model as (1) they are not common within nonprofit
literature and (2) have not yet been considered in the context of mission drift.

3.3 Funding Source and Influences on Mission Drift
In the last chapter, I shared that diversification of funding is an approach
organizations use to manage mission drift because it can offset the negative effects of
environmental resource constraints and minimize funders' ability to influence the
organization's operations. However, some options available to increase funding diversity
may introduce other influences that might lead to mission drift. Therefore, in this paper, I
argue that while diversity in funding can help avoid funder-driven mission drift, other
influences emerge when organizations pursue particular funding sources, specifically
government funding and commercial revenue.
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Figure 3: Research
Model

3.3.1 Funding Sources
While there are several potential funding sources for nonprofit organizations, two
principal sources that might influence mission drift include government funding and
commercial revenue (Berrett & Holliday, 2018). Therefore, I selected these two funding
sources as independent variables. Different funding sources come with different
expectations. Direct external influences come from funders who provide grants to provide
specific services (Ni & Zhan, 2017). Government grants often include stipulations
regarding how the organization operates, which may increase the potential of mission
drift. Some nonprofit organizations also seek to generate additional funding through
commercial revenue. In this case, there are demands associated with running a business,
which might run counter to the demands of running a nonprofit organization (Froelich,
1999; Weisbrod, 2004). These conflicts may impact the organization differently
(Battilana & Lee, 2014). The following sections will outline how those influences might
play out in greater detail.
3.3.2 Commercial Revenue
When more nonprofits began pursuing commercial revenue, most practitioners
assumed it would draw attention away from the organizations' missions, as the pursuit of
commercial revenue would focus the organization on generating an economic return
rather than creating social value (Froelich, 1999; Weisbrod, 2004). Whether that is true is
still up for debate. It might not detract from the mission, as some scholars have found that
taxable revenue does not draw attention away from the mission (Yetman & Yetman,
2009). Indeed, there may be some benefits to the addition of commercial revenue. A
study of Flemish sheltered workshops found that organizations that increased their
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economic orientation also increased their social performance (Staessens et al., 2019).
These increases were higher than those with a primary focus on increasing their social
performance. It might also be easier for hybrid organizations to build legitimacy from
audiences that ascribe to beliefs of each orientation (social versus economic), thereby
increasing access to funding and external appreciation (Durand & Thornton, 2018;
Perkmann et al., 2019).
On the other hand, commercial revenue might lead to mission drift, likely due to
differences in goals and worldviews. Related to goals, a qualitative research study on the
food and beverage industry in the U.K. and Italy found that conflicting demands by
funders led to an increase in the incidence of mission drift (Civera et al., 2020). Related
to differences in worldviews, the tension in attempting to align with potentially disparate
worldviews might cause conflict (Pache & Santos, 2010). This tension could cause a
feeling of being pulled in two different directions as the organization pursues a dual
mission (Austin et al., 2006). Tension might also emerge as the organization tries to
reconcile the competing worldviews (Besharov & Smith, 2014; Pache & Santos, 2010).
Additionally, potential conflicts might arise related to obtaining legitimacy from
stakeholders who might adhere more strongly to one of the two worldviews (Doherty et
al., 2014). For instance, a commercial orientation suggests that revenues take priority,
while a social orientation suggests that the organization prioritizes people and sociallyoriented goals. Placing a priority on social goals with venture capitalists might result in a
loss of legitimacy with the potential investors, and potential loss in funding, further
exacerbating resource constraints. For example, a study of Cambodian nonprofits found
that the introduction of commercial revenue negatively affected the amount of focus on
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the social mission (Khieng & Dahles, 2015a). I suggest that tensions, overall, might still
lead to mission drift. This line of reasoning leads us to my first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Commercial revenue will be associated with an increase in
the incidence of mission drift.

3.3.3 Government Funding
Although one study found that the addition of government revenue did not
increase the probability of mission drift (Berrett & Holliday, 2018), other studies have
found the opposite. For instance, after accepting government contracts, many nonprofit
organizations in the U.K. in the 1990s experienced mission drift after opting to adapt
their missions to take on those contracts (Bennett & Savani, 2011). One study
(Raaijmakers et al., 2015) investigated how childcare providers in Germany negotiated
differences between their operational perspective with a government perspective (as the
necessity to comply with state regulations increased). The authors found that it took a
significant amount of time for the childcare providers to comply with complex
governmental expectations. The attention spent on compliance drew managers away from
the social aspect of their mission. Another reason government funding might negatively
affect mission drift is that it may not cover the full cost of managing the intended
program, as was the case for child welfare providers in New York (Marwell & Calabrese,
2015). The researchers surmised that organizations diverted funding from fundraising to
program expenses. Cutting spending on fundraising would likely then result in lower
overall funding. Additionally, funding priorities of government agencies may chance,
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resulting in a significant loss in funding that is not easily replaced (Mitchell, 2014).
Therefore:
Hypothesis 2: Government funding will be associated with an increase in
the incidence of mission drift.

3.4 Managing Mission Drift
As mentioned earlier, Mitchell (2014) suggests that RDT is an appropriate
framework for exploring how funding sources can influence nonprofit organizations.
Much of the research within RDT focuses on five primary ways organizations can
manage resource providers' influences (Hillman et al., 2009). These include growth, joint
ventures, boards of directors, lobbying, and executive succession. In looking at mission
drift from an RDT perspective, we would expect that the management practices that
apply to RDT to help improve firm performance might also help organizations avoid
mission drift. This paper focuses on just three of these: strong governance practices,
growth (as operationalized as professionalization), and lobbying. Although lobbying is
not often included in nonprofit studies, prior research in RDT has indicated that it can
reduce resource dependencies, especially in organizations that receive government
funding (Li et al., 2017; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The following sections cover these
topics in further detail.

3.4.1 Strong Governance Practices
Scholars have suggested using the lens of organizational controls to understand
the role of governance in the nonprofit sector (Byers et al., 2015). Malmi and Brown

42

(2008, p. 290) define management controls as "all the devices and systems managers use
to ensure that the behaviours and decisions of their employees are consistent with the
organisation's objectives and strategies." Although this typology has not been present in
the mission drift literature, researchers have used it in the context of managing
sustainability programs in large corporations (Crutzen et al., 2017). This precedent
suggests that it might also be relevant in studying organizations with a social value
orientation, such as nonprofit organizations.
Strong Governance Practices, Commercialization, and Mission Drift.
Strong governance practices at the firm level may help organizations avoid
mission drift as these practices provide a framework and boundaries within which
the organization must avoid moving too far away from its mission (Logue &
Grimes, 2019). Strong governance practices limit discretion in behavior, which
might increase barriers to mission drift. Although limiting discretion in behavior
through board practices was included in Pfeffer and Salancik's (2003) book as a
management practice to address social control conditions, it has received
surprisingly little attention in the literature. When using this management practice,
organizations commit to decisions that limit their ability to engage in behaviors
outside the purviews of what they have committed. The nonprofit sector has
embraced strong governance principles as evidence of a healthy organization. For
example, the Better Business Bureau's ("BBB Standards for Charity
Accountability," n.d.) charity ranking system includes a list of requirements
related to how an organization might behave, including many related to
governance. The BBB does not hold direct control over potential funding the
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organization might receive; however, meeting those standards has been associated
with higher charitable gift revenue levels (Chen, 2009).
Limiting discretion in behavior might also result from the board of an
organization choosing to specialize in a particular aspect of their work, thereby
intentionally forgoing funding for unrelated activities. The board of an international
environmental Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) based in the United States chose
to adopt a policy to specialize in a particular aspect of their work. The respondent had the
following to say about how this protected the organization:
If a donor wants to give us money for something that is not part of what
[this organization] does, we attempt to educate them as to what [this
organization] is really doing and how it's effective in helping, and how
unique [this organization] is …there isn't another organization [that] does
what [this organization] does…and if there still is not consensus on that
then we do not accept their funds. (Mitchell, 2014, p. 81)
At least one study (Dai et al., 2017) explored ways these management
controls might help a hybrid organization (in this case, a Chinese state-owned
enterprise that had recently completed an IPO) maintain focus on its mission.
Additionally, in their systematic literature review, Nielsen and colleagues (2019)
found evidence that performance management systems, a type of management
control, might affect an organization's ability to manage competing goals. Related
to the nonprofit sector, scholars have suggested that accountability, a significant
focus of management controls, helps the organization avoid mission drift
(Ebrahim et al., 2014).
However, developing a formal infrastructure for the board requires a
significant time investment (Braganza & Lambert, 2000). Finance research has
suggested that distracted shareholders (Kempf et al., 2017) or board members
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(Masulis & Zhang, 2019) might lower firm performance. Specifically, Masulis
and Zhang's study of S&P 1500 companies considered external distractions from
governance, resulting in lower firm profitability and lower firm valuation.
Research on the corporate governance life cycle also finds costs related to
developing strong governance practices (Aguilera et al., 2008; Filatotchev et al.,
2006).
Specific costs in the nonprofit context include direct costs, opportunity
costs, and costs related to human resource issues, both on the board and in
management. Organizations that primarily rely on government funding and
commercial revenue may be less likely to be able to absorb these costs. Direct
costs related to developing strong governance practices and taking on a more
prominent monitoring role may be high (Aguilera et al., 2008). These might be
directly associated with funders' tracking and reporting requirements (Calabrese,
2013). It might also include an external audit of the financial statements or other
audit requirements specific to particular funders (Bernstein, 1991). The cost of
insurance policies for the board (Directors and Officers policies) also increases as
the organization grows, adding costs (Foxman, 2008).
Opportunity costs are a second consideration (Aguilera et al., 2008). According to
the attention-based view, attention is a finite resource that, once expended, cannot be
used elsewhere (Ocasio, 1997). Suppose the nonprofit organization's board chooses to
invest attention in developing strong governance practices. In that case, they may have
less time to spend on issues related to pursuing their social mission. Mission drift
research has suggested that spending time on mission-related activities at the board level
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is essential to helping the organization maintain focus on its mission (Battilana, 2018;
Ebrahim et al., 2014; Wolf & Mair, 2019). A study of for-profit Brazilian organizations
with a corporate social responsibility component found that attention spent on their social
responsibility goals reduced financial performance (Ferreira, 2017). It stands to reason
that the reverse might also be true, in that social performance might suffer when the
organization places attention elsewhere. As charitable donors emphasize social outcomes
(Osili et al., 2018; Sargeant et al., 2006), reduced social outcomes may reduce individual
giving, leading to increased resource constraints and a higher probability of mission drift.
Finally, the organization's human resource needs are also likely to change as
formalization on the board increases (Filatotchev et al., 2006). Specifically, the
organization will need staff and board members who understand monitoring issues and
know how to complete complex reporting forms (Bernstein, 1991; Calabrese, 2013). For
instance, strong governance practices within the context of housing associations in the
U.K. resulted in decreased participation by tenant board members (McDermont, 2007).
McDermont suggested that their decreased level of participation was related to power
issues. Still, it may have also related to tenant board members feeling as if they were
unable to contribute to discussions. Solving these human resource challenges takes time,
as it requires either training existing staff and board members or recruiting new ones.
In addition, starting a profit-generating venture is associated with several
costs. Corporate entrepreneurship literature suggests that undertaking additional
lines of business requires resources, including business practices, resources, and
competencies (Covin & Slevin, 1991). Time is another essential resource
(Hornsby et al., 2002). Suppose a nonprofit organization already deals with the
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associated costs of starting a profit-generating business. In that case, they will be
less able to simultaneously absorb the costs of developing and maintaining strong
governance mechanisms. These findings lead me to believe that time invested in
developing strong governance practices might distract board members from
ensuring that they focus on their social mission. Therefore:
Hypothesis 3: The positive effect of commercial revenue on mission drift is
more pronounced as levels of strong governance practices increase.

3.4.2 Professionalization
"… the fear is that nonprofits will become so like business firms
that the social missions will take a backseat to revenue and profitability
goals, leading to an identity crisis in the sector, a loss of legitimacy, and
eventual elimination of special privileges and protections for nonprofit
organizations" (Froelich 1999, p 258).
In nonprofit research, professionalization refers to increased education levels and
valuing formal knowledge (Hwang & Powell, 2009). RDT suggests that growth (Pfeffer
& Salancik, 1978) can help organizations reduce their dependence on external resource
providers (Hillman et al., 2009). For instance, organizational lifecycles research suggests
that as organizations grow, they invest in staff and training programs (Mia et al., 2019;
Whetten, 1987). This change is especially true in the nonprofit context, where
organizations often start with an-volunteer workforce and then transition into a paid
workforce. As nonprofits grow, they tend to require more expertise to manage
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fundraising processes, (Betzler & Gmür, 2016), contracts, grant management, human
resources, accounting, and other administrative requirements (Searing & Lecy, 2021).
There are several reasons professionalization might lead to an increase in mission
drift. These include changes in what the organization is measuring, focus, priorities, and
staffing. First, there might be changes in what, precisely, is being measured. In the case
of the emerging nonprofit sector in Morocco and Palestine, scholars found that complex
application and reporting requirements resulted in several changes that negatively
affected the organization's ability to pursue its primary mission (Atia & Herrold, 2018).
First, reporting focused on quantitative metrics, which typically measure outputs (such as
the number of people attending a crime-prevention training) rather than outcomes (fewer
crimes committed). The focus of the organization, therefore, shifted towards outputs.
Second, the bureaucracy that developed to meet funders' needs resulted in the
organization spending more attention on appeasing donor requests, shifting the
organization's focus. As funders obtained more power in relationships, the organizations
were more likely to direct their attention away from making permanent, systemic changes
in the community served. Instead, they focused on programs their donors emphasized,
resulting in mission drift. Research on social movements has reported a similar
phenomenon (Piven & Cloward, 2012). In their analysis of four different social
movements, Piven and Cloward found that organizers' desire to create a social movement
(an output) hindered their ability to create systemic change (an outcome).
Second, professionalization might lead to a change in focus. As mentioned earlier,
Ko and Liu (2020) found that the introduction of commercial revenue led many
organizations towards professionalization. This change was evidenced by the leaders'
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formalizing the business's operations and developing a skilled workforce. Both changes
required attention from management, which caused the organization's overall focus to
change. As organizations scale up, they are likely to face challenges both with the
formalization of the organization and recruiting more trained staff. In a study of a
business incubator in a university environment, the researchers found that the process of
scaling up, including the need to professionalize, led to an inability to maintain a focus on
its goals of helping new ventures grow and integrating students actively in the work of
the organization (Ometto et al., 2019).
Third, there might be a change in priorities. Evidence suggests that as staff
members within nonprofit organizations increase their professionalization, the
organization often shifts its priorities towards economic stability. One line of research
from the microfinance literature is individual staff members' impact on mission drift,
specifically loan officers' background and level of experience and where decision-making
authority lies within the organization. First, one study explored whether loan officers'
career backgrounds would affect the amount of funds lent to poorer borrowers. As
evidenced by lending patterns, they found that mission drift was avoided when the loan
officer had previously been a farmer or worked in the local government (Jia et al., 2016).
Second, as the credit officer's experience level increased, the numbers of vulnerable
clients they served (as evidenced by loan size and clients who are young or have a
disability) appear to decrease (Beisland, D'Espallier, & Mersland, 2019). In another case,
mission drift, caused by a drift in organizational practices, was more likely to occur in
cases where (1) the organization empowered field-level staff to decide which clients to
serve, and (2) incentives were given for increased efficiency and an increase in revenue
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for the microfinance organization (Maitrot, 2019). This drift was due to individuals
prioritizing their potential incentives over the organization's mission. These adjustments
in the individual decisions and practices led to an overall drift in the organization's
mission. These findings suggest that as a nonprofit’s professionalization increases,
mission drift may become more likely.
Fourth, research suggests that changes in staffing might affect mission drift.
Beaton (2019) explored cases where nonprofit organizations began to adopt business
practices more commonly adopted by for-profit entities. Traditionally, nonprofits have
emphasized social goals. Recently, many nonprofits have increased their emphasis on
business goals. Interestingly, there was little conflict with these changes in Beaton's
study. Beaton suggests that nonprofits leaders often accept business practices without
much tension, as those business practices can help pursue the organization's mission. The
arguments nonprofit leaders use to justify this include beliefs such as 'No Margin, No
Mission,' which recognizes the importance of remaining financially healthy to continue
serving clients. Another related argument is 'More Efficiency, More Mission,' which
seeks to lower costs through increased efficiency, providing more funding to accomplish
the mission. Through these and similar arguments, nonprofit leaders may miss signals
that the organization is changing its value orientation from achieving social goals to
attaining economic goals. Due to professionalization affecting both goals and beliefs of
the organization, I suggest:
Hypothesis 4a: The positive effect of commercial revenue on mission drift
will be more pronounced as levels of professionalization increase.
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Hypothesis 4b: The positive effect of government funding on mission drift
will be more pronounced as levels of professionalization increase.

3.4.3 Lobbying
An often-overlooked management practice of reducing environmental
dependencies relates to lobbying to influence the environment to become more amenable
to the firm's interests (Hillman et al., 2009). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 189, 190) refer
to this as 'controlling interdependence through law and social sanction.' Within the
nonprofit context, it is customary for nonprofit organizations to work together toward
creating laws and policies that help organizations achieve their social goals (Casey,
2011). There has been scant attention in the nonprofit literature about the effect and
outcomes of lobbying (Almog-Bar & Schmid, 2014), as most articles appear to focus
only on whether organizations lobby (Hillman et al., 2009; Mitchell, 2014). For instance,
in a study of nonprofit organizations in Flanders, the scholars found that organizations
that received government funding did not often appear to engage in efforts to influence
the government (Verschuere & De Corte, 2015). This was also true in Jordan (AbdelSamad, 2017) but not in China, where organizations receiving government funding were
more likely to engage in advocacy (Li et al., 2017). Social movements reliant on the
government for their funding are less likely to engage in advocacy work, resulting in the
organizations being less likely to reach their stated goals (Piven & Cloward, 2012).
Government funding and lobbying. Although government funding is relatively
consistent, it also comes with high costs often not covered by the provided funding
(Calabrese, 2013; Gronbjerg, 1991; Marwell & Calabrese, 2015). These costs are
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associated with reporting requirements, complex application forms, the need to be
available for site visits, and other accountability requirements (Calabrese, 2013). As
suggested earlier, the shortfall funding to compensate for these costs likely needs to come
from fundraising or administrative budgets (Marwell & Calabrese, 2015). Lobbying
would take further attention – and money – from fundraising and administration costs.
This diversion of time and attention might result in additional financial constraints and an
increased likelihood of mission drift (Ault, 2016; Kwong et al., 2017; Mersland & Strøm,
2010). Therefore, I propose that nonprofits that receive government funding and engage
in lobbying might experience an increase in mission drift.
Hypothesis 5: The positive effect of government funding on mission drift
will become more pronounced as levels of lobbying increase.

3.5 The Case of Organizational Stigma
As suggested in chapter two, organizational stigma may influence mission drift.
Of the three studies covered in Section 2.4, the only organization that did not drift from
its mission was funded primarily by commercial revenue. In the case of a Swedish
community center (Barinaga, 2020), the organization adjusted its goals to better align
with one of its primary funders, a governmental municipality. A gun prevention program
based in Manchester, U.K., shifted its focus from gang interventions to serving at-risk
youth (Bullock & Tilley, 2008). While no funding source is defined, it is an interagency
partnership that includes governmental and nonprofit agencies. Finally, Keystone, the
agency serving a migrant population, relied primarily on commercial revenue earned
from consulting, a conference center, and a retail food business (Tracey & Phillips, 2016)
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and did not indicate any drift. Therefore, funding sources appear to play a role in the
relationship between organizational stigma, revenue generation, and mission drift.
Much of the literature related to managing organizational stigma focuses on the
ability of the organization to manage its messaging. For instance, Chowdhury and
associates (2021) propose that an organization's ability to 'sell' their issue, in other words,
reframe how potential stakeholders think about the cause, will affect the ability of the
organization to obtain needed funding. Selling the issue was a strategy used by the
marijuana industry to help stakeholders see the benefits of medical marijuana for the sick
and dying instead of being just a recreational product (Dioun, 2018). The ability to sell
also helped a travel agency in Victorian England overcome objections by the elite, who
saw the travel agency as 'morally abject' (Hampel & Tracey, 2017). In other words,
organizations that can manage their messaging are better able to reframe how
stakeholders feel about the stigma. Nonprofit organizations engaged in commercial
activities will likely have a higher ability to craft messages that will help stakeholders see
the issue in a new and different way (Chowdhury et al., 2021). This will likely result in
more partnership and funding opportunities, leading to increased funding and the
organization's ability to maintain focus on its primary mission. Therefore:
Hypothesis 6: The positive effect of commercial revenue on mission drift
will become less pronounced in cases of organizational stigma.

3.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter developed the model for this study that explores the relationships
between funding sources, management practices, and organizational stigma. It first
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highlighted aspects of RDT relevant to the resource dependencies in nonprofit
organizations, specifically those related to diversity in funding. The chapter then
discussed how management practices from RDT, including strong governance practices,
professionalization, and lobbying, might help organizations manage mission drift.
Finally, I considered the effect of organizational stigma on the incidence of mission drift.
The following chapter will propose methods this study will incorporate to test these
hypotheses.
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CHAPTER FOUR: METHODS

4.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter outlines the methods used in this study to test the hypotheses
presented in Chapter 3. Section 4.2 describes the data collection processes, including
details regarding the sample and data sources used in this study, followed by detailed
information regarding the measures in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 outlines the statistical
analysis used. Finally, section 4.5 provides a chapter summary.

4.2 Data Collection
In this study, I sought to understand how funding source affects mission drift. In
addition, I wanted to test whether management mechanisms (as outlined by RDT) or
organizational stigma affected that relationship. While cross-sectional studies can show
us whether different variables are related, longitudinal data can provide evidence that a
causal relationship might exist. Therefore, I sought to create a longitudinal dataset to
answer the research questions.
Although mission drift has been studied in many contexts (such as microfinance
institutions and social enterprises), I chose to study it in the context of nonprofit
organizations. There are several reasons for this. First, the influence of funders might be
more pronounced in this sector. For instance, the person receiving the service and the
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entity paying for the service are often different, potentially resulting in disparate goals
between the recipient and the payor (Santos, Pache, & Birkholz, 2015). Second,
nonprofits must serve both social and economic goals (at a minimum, they must obtain
enough revenue to stay fiscally solvent); nonprofit organizations may experience mission
drift due to the tensions that arise from those potentially disparate goals (Doherty et al.,
2014). For instance, increased tensions can lead to conflict or organizational paralysis
(e.g., avoiding a final decision on goals) as members attempt to reconcile the competing
perspectives (Besharov & Smith, 2014; Pache & Santos, 2010). These tensions can lead
to higher levels of mission drift, as evidenced by a qualitative research study within the
context of the food and beverage industry in the U.K. and Italy (Civera, Cortese, Mosca,
& Murdock, 2020).
Data was collected from IRS Form 990 nonprofit tax returns, the annual filing
required from most US-based nonprofit organizations. Using this data allowed for the
creation of a longitudinal data set covering a 10-year time period. Accessing a digital
version of this data was made possible once organizations began filing returns
electronically. Earlier returns are available only via pdf copies of tax returns.
Developing a longitudinal data set to assess relationships has several benefits.
Specifically, it controls for individual heterogeneity, results in lower levels of
collinearity, illuminates responses to changes that occur over time, and allows testing of
more complicated models (Baltagi, 2008). However, as Baltagi notes, using panel data
may also have limitations, such as being expensive to collect, being subject to
measurement errors, and participants dropping out. The use of annual government tax
filings reduces some of these concerns, including those about (1) data collection (as the
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collection is already occurring via a third party), (2) measurement errors (in that the legal
obligations related to tax filings lead to more accurate responses), and (3) selectivity
related to nonresponse and attrition (as respondents are legally obligated to submit these
returns). However, some challenges remain. Using existing datasets may result in
difficulty finding appropriate measures for all desired variables in a study. However,
using nonprofit tax returns provides many variables to select from, making finding
proxies for the constructs easier.
Mitchell (2014) studied ways that funding sources might influence international
nonprofit organizations and suggested that future studies use a broader sample (than just
transnational organizations) to increase the generalizability of findings. Therefore, this
study uses a random sample from a panel dataset of all U.S. nonprofit organizations that
filed an IRS Form 990 between 2010 and 2018. Before 2010, only a selection of returns
each year was made publicly accessible. In addition, IRS Form 990 only added in-depth
questions regarding governance practices in 2008. Therefore, earlier data is not available.

4.2.1 Population Description
To be included in the sampling frame, nonprofit organizations included in this
study meet six criteria. The first two criteria relate to methodological reasons, and the last
four are theoretically based. First, they were registered as 501(c)3 organizations in the
United States and filed an IRS Form 990 online between 2010 and 2021. Filers
occasionally submit amendments to returns (14,658 tax returns); therefore, only the later
return was retained as the data was redundant. Second, they had at least five years of data
available in the file for the analysis to pick up on trends.
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Third, the organizations needed to be based in the United States and primarily
serve a need in the United States. This was because stakeholder influence would have
less impact when the stakeholder and the organization are based in different areas.
Therefore, returns with a foreign filer address (573) and those that served a foreign
audience (38,112) were removed.
Fourth, organizations formed as trusts or associations were dropped, as
corporations' governance mechanisms are different from those of trusts and associations.
Therefore, organizations formed as associations (17,490), trusts (5,243), or other (10,601)
organizational forms were removed.
Fifth, the organizations had to be independent of other organizations and not be
part of a group tax return. The justification for this is that organizations dependent on
another entity do not have the same resource dependencies as standalone organizations.
There are at least three reasons for this relationship. First, some organizations that obtain
group exemptions consist of a 'fiscal sponsor' and its subsidiary organizations. The fiscal
sponsor does not have responsibility for raising funds for all member groups and often
charges a percentage of funds raised to cover their costs (Andersson & Neely, 2017).
Therefore, including the fiscal sponsors could be problematic, as their resource
dependencies are not related to the actual dollars they report. In addition, a local member
of a group exemption will have their revenue reported on their local tax return and the
group return of the national organization (Grønbjerg, 2002). Having this income doublereported may affect analysis results. Finally, the member and the organization filing the
group exemption are often located in different communities, making controlling for
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regional differences problematic (Grønbjerg, 2002). Therefore, I dropped organizations
that were part of a group return or a consolidated group return (35,318 tax returns).
Sixth, to be included, nonprofits also had to be "publicly supported"
organizations, meaning their primary support comes from public support rather than from
earned income (such as universities and hospitals) ("Publicly Supported Charities |
Internal Revenue Service," n.d.). Being a publicly supported charity indicates that the
organization receives most of its funds from contributions and may be more subject to
internal resource constraints. This information was identified through information
submitted on Schedule A of the IRS Form 990 (Part 1, Reason for Public Charity Status).
This resulted in the removal of 204,305 tax returns.
Table 3: Summary Table, Population

Tax Year Frequency
2010
92,742
2011
120,475
2012
135,774
2013
150,538
2014
165,512
2015
176,969
2016
183,128
2017
106,124
2018
185,121
2019
197,759
2020
97,943
2021
144
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Table 3 includes the numbers of electronic filers of the IRS Form 990 (available
as of September 2021)1 registered as corporations, not part of a group return, and
registered as 501(c)3 organizations. There were fewer tax returns available for 2017 than
in other years, likely due to a change in how the IRS reported data. This provides a
population of 1,612,229 tax returns. IRS data was supplemented with data from the
National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS)2.

4.2.2 Sample Selection
I conducted an a priori power test to determine the appropriate sample size. Given
that the number of predictors (including controls) is 33, the number of tested predictors is
6, and the estimated effect size is .05, an a priori power test for a linear multiple
regression model (Faul et al., 2009) computes a minimum sample size of 424. To err on
the side of caution, I selected a sample of 1,000 organizations (or 0.74526% of the
organizations represented) using Stata/SE 16.1 with a seed of 1234567. This sample size
ensured that a large enough sample would be present, even if additional reductions
needed to be made based on a manual review of the data.
As a secondary check to ensure that the organizations appearing in the sample
were independent, I completed a manual review of the data. A visual scan of the

1
IRS 990 Tax Return data is available from https://registry.opendata.aws/irs990/ in XML format
and is made available in CSV form by Open 990 (https://appliednonprofitresearch.com/documentation/irs990-spreadsheets/). That data is now (as of January 1, 2022) available in zip files directly from the IRS at
2
Data from the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) is available at
https://nccs.urban.org/.
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organizations and mission statements identified organizations that were supporting
organizations of other entities and, therefore, not independent. For instance, the
description indicated that the organization raised funds to support a different
organization. One organization did not include its mission statement in its IRS Form 990
filings. As textual analysis of the mission statement is the dependent variable in this
study, this organization was also removed from the sample. These changes resulted in
removing an additional 27 organizations. At this point, I identified organizations with
years of missing data in the middle of runs of data. I attempted to manually locate that
missing data by pulling up the xml files for the returns via open990.org and located
additional data for 299 tax returns.
Once these adjustments were completed, 961 organizations remained in the
sample, represented by 8,059 tax returns, still meeting the minimum recommended
sample size of 424 organizations. The remaining organizations represent an assortment of
causes, including health clinics, afterschool programs, ministries, sports leagues, and
volunteer fire programs, to name a few.
This sample is an unbalanced data set, as not all years are available for all
organizations. In some cases, the missing data relates to a change in the way the
organization filed. For instance, some organizations switched to an IRS Form 990EZ
filing, which meant that key variables were not present in the data. In other cases, the
organization missed their filing, or at least it was not available when the IRS last released
tax return data for nonprofit organizations (October 2021).
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Table 4: Representativeness of Sample, descriptive statistics
Population
Sample
Mean
Mean
Total Assets
5,956,630.00
5,088,946.00
Founding Year
1984
1984
Board Members, Total
13.51
15.93
Government Funding
943,767.80
608,800.00
Commercial Revenue
12,102.27
2,983.23
Expenses, Total
4,401,955.00
3,811,343.00
Employees
73.74
54.31
Volunteers
398.09
352.35
Purpose: Arts
0.09
0.11
Purpose: Education
0.07
0.06
Purpose: Health
0.13
0.13
Purpose: Human Services
0.40
0.38
Purpose: Other
0.20
0.22

Difference
(Amount)
867,684.00
0.36
(2.42)
334,967.80
9,119.04
590,612.00
19.43
45.74
(0.02)
0.01
0.00
0.02
(0.02)

Difference
(Percent)
-14.57%
-0.02%
17.94%
-35.49%
-75.35%
-13.42%
-26.35%
-11.49%
18.47%
-11.88%
-2.78%
-5.41%
10.74%

4.2.3 Representativeness of the Sample
To confirm that the sample was representative of the population, I first compared
key characteristics between the population and the sample, as shown in Table 4.
Although most numbers in the sample are within a 20% range of the population, there
were some notable differences. For instance, government funding is 35.49% lower than
the population, and commercial revenue is 75.35% lower. Therefore, to test whether these
differences represent a statistically significant difference between the population and
sample, I ran a random-effects logistic regression for panel data (xtlogit in Stata). This
analysis allowed me to determine whether the organization's characteristics were
predictive of the organization’s inclusion as part of the sample versus the population
(minus the sample). It was necessary to use a panel data model due to violations in the
data related to the independence assumption of t-tests. A fixed-effect analysis was also
not possible, as some variables were time-invariant. Based on this information, it appears
that the two groups are statistically different (Wald chi2(13)=29.73, p < .01). However,
the only statistically significant coefficient, government funding, has a very low
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coefficient (0.00, p<.01). Because the practical difference of that value was very close to
0, I proceeded with the analysis.
Table 5: Sample Representativeness, Regression Analysis
group
Coef.
Std. Err. z
Total Assets
0.00
0.00
-1.02
Founding Year
0.00
0.00
0.37
Board, Total Members
0.00
0.00
-1.33
Government Funding
0.00
0.00
-3.49
Commercial Revenue
0.00
0.00
-0.68
Total Expenses
0.00
0.00
0.67
Employees
0.00
0.00
-1.51
Volunteer
0.00
0.00
-0.08
Purpose: Arts
0.04
0.25
0.15
Purpose: Education
-0.30
0.28
-1.08
Purpose: Health
-0.21
0.23
-0.91
Purpose: Human Services
-0.17
0.19
-0.89
Purpose: Other
-0.00
0.21
-0.03
_cons
-29.48
5.06
-5.82

P>z
0.31
0.71
0.19
0.00
0.49
0.50
0.13
0.94
0.88
0.28
0.36
0.37
0.98
0.00

[95% Conf. Interval]
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
-0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
-0.45
0.52
-0.85
0.25
-0.67
0.25
-0.55
0.21
-0.42
0.40
-39.41
-19.56

4.3 Measures
This section provides details related to the operationalization of key constructs.
Full details of these are provided in Table 6, entitled Variables of Interest. Computations
of scores of the variables are provided in Section 5.2.

4.3.1 Dependent Variable: Mission Drift
Mission drift is the dependent variable for this study. Scholars have defined
mission drift as when an organization's activities do not align with its stated purpose
(D'Espallier et al., 2017; Jones, 2007). Prior research has used industry-specific
measurements, such as loans given in the microfinance industry (Beisland et al., 2019;
Caserta et al., 2018), changing organizational types in the higher education industry
(Jaquette, 2013), and numbers of clients placed in jobs in social service organizations
(Staessens et al., 2019). I operationalize mission drift as a change in the organization's
value orientation, as evidenced by textual analysis of the mission statement.
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Mission statements were retrieved from information provided on the IRS Form
990, the annual tax reporting document required by the IRS. In tax returns where the
mission statement was not available or was incomplete, I obtained additional information
through ProPublica.com, a repository for scanned IRS Form 990s.
I performed textual analysis on the mission statements to determine how much the
social versus commercial focus changed. If an organization's mission changed
significantly enough for its values to shift, it indicated that there may have been mission
drift. Content analysis on mission statements has been found to be an accurate indicator
of the organization's purpose. (Fyall et al., 2018; Leuthesser & Kohli, 1997; Moss et al.,
2011). Within the social entrepreneurship literature, researchers used mission statements
to confirm that social enterprises exhibit a duality of purpose, in that they indicate a
commitment to creating both social and economic value (Moss et al., 2011). Two benefits
of using textual analysis are that it enables the study to be easily repeated (Finkelstein &
Hambrick, 1996) and is less obtrusive than other options for gaining insights into
cognitions due to the use of archival records rather than interviews (Phillips, 1994).
Mission statements, in particular, are designed to highlight the purpose of the
organization and are central to the strategic planning process (Pearce & David, 1987),
both indicators that will help determine the organization's primary purpose. Researchers
have found this to be particularly true in the nonprofit sector (Souder, 2016).
In addition, mission statements appear to be more accurate in determining a
nonprofit organization’s purpose than the NTEE (National Taxonomy of Exempt
Entities) code (Fyall et al., 2018). Fyall and colleagues (2018) first identified the
population of nonprofits that filed IRS Form 990s in Washington State that had
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information regarding the mission statement available. They then created a dictionary of
words which related to homeless organizations and identified those organizations which
were involved in serving the homeless. After several iterative steps, they found that over
twice the number of organizations were providing housing services than the number
indicated by just the NTEE code. As the authors were able to better identify the purpose
of the organization through the use of mission statements, I propose that this is an
appropriate measure to capture the value of the organization as evidenced by the social or
economic focus of the mission statement. The results and details of the textual analysis
are provided in Section 5.2.1.
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Table 6: Variables of Interest
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4.3.2 Independent Variables
The funding sources used in this study are commercial revenue and government
funding, consistent with Sherer and colleagues (2019) study that suggested funding
source might affect organizational performance. Commercial revenue only includes
Unrelated Business Income as reported on the IRS Form 990. Some nonprofit
organizations also collect fees for activities related to their mission. For instance, the Girl
Scouts, an organization that seeks to create social value, also has a commercial interest in
selling cookies. While, on the surface, that might seem to be unrelated, the Girl Scouts
see participation in this activity as teaching life skills such as responsibility, goal setting,
and business principles (Atkin, 1990; Goerisch & Swanson, 2015). Since selling cookies
is a program that is integral to the organization's social mission, that, and activities from
similar activities in other organizations, would not be included in commercial revenue.
Government funding was measured using grants from the government reported in tax
filings. Although some organizations also receive contracts and other support from the
government, that data was not available from annual tax filing data.
I adjusted the amounts reported in tax returns where the analysis would result in
undefined answers. For instance, rather than reporting gross UBI, some organizations
reported net revenues from these activities, some of which were negative values.
Therefore, following a manual review of these organizations' tax returns, I adjusted the
total to equal the gross revenue from the known categories. Adjustments were made for
90 tax returns. Additionally, there were 22 tax returns where the total revenue reported
was less than the total of government funding and commercial revenue for the year due to
losses incurred in other activities, such as investments (246 tax returns) and other (561
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tax returns). In these instances, I adjusted the total revenue to equal total government
funding and commercial revenue for the given tax return so that the funding ratios would
remain between 0 and 1.

4.3.3 Moderators and Mediators
Strong governance practices. Strong governance practices have emerged from
best practices advocated by national governance training programs such as BoardSource
and watchdog groups such as GuideStar (now known as Candid) and the Better Business
Bureau (Standard 1). These best practices focus on ensuring that boards of directors
fulfill their oversight role, part of which is to ensure that the organization stays focused
on the organization's mission (BBB Standards for Charity Accountability, n.d.). The IRS
Form 990 was revised in 2008 to include questions about these governance best practices.
I base my conceptualization of strong governance on Harris and associates (2017) work,
which considers monitoring by a board of directors, independence of key individuals,
tone at the top, and capital provider oversight. I used ten variables from the IRS Form
990 to reflect these characteristics and completed a factor analysis to reduce the
dimensions. Details of this analysis are available in Section 5.2.3.
Board Monitoring consists of three proxies. First is general monitoring by the
board, indicated by the governing body receiving a copy of the IRS Form 990 before they
file it. Next is financial monitoring by the board, indicted by whether the organization has
an audit committee. The final proxy for board monitoring is independent external
monitoring, indicated by whether the charity has had an audit completed by an
independent accountant.
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Independence of Key Individuals also is represented by three proxies. The first is a
ratio that compares independent board members to the total number of voting board
members. This number varies between 0 and 1. A higher number indicates higher
independence of individual board members. Per directions issued by the IRS, the total
voting members of an organizations governing body are inclusive of independent voting
board members. However, a handful of cases (29 tax returns) reported a higher number of
independent board members than the number of total board members. In those cases, I
adjusted the number of total board members to reflect the larger number. As independent
board members are a subset of total board members, it would be impossible to have more
independent board members than total board members.
The second proxy relates to whether family or business relationships exist
between board members or between board members and employees of the organization.
Finally, the last proxy indicates whether the organization has officially adopted a conflict
of interest policy.
There are two proxies for Tone at the Top. The first is having a whistle-blower
policy, while the second indicates that management duties have not been contracted to an
outside party. These are coded "1" for yes and "0" for no.
Capital Provider Oversight indicates the final aspect of strong governance in this
study. This consists of two proxies, each indicated by oversight from a different
stakeholder, specifically municipal bond investors and donors of restricted funds.
Restrictions from donors might be indicated on the IRS Form 990 by the presence of
temporarily restricted funds, permanently restricted funds, or endowments. Therefore, if
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any of these fields have an affirmative answer, the value of this variable will be 1. Again,
these variables are coded "1" for yes and "0" for no.
Professionalization. Professionalization relates to increased levels of education
and when formal knowledge becomes more highly valued (Hwang & Powell, 2009).
Based on Sanzo-Pérez and associates (2017) work, I use three proxies to assess
professionalization. I then compute an index score based on these three variables. The
first proxy is the ratio of paid staff to volunteers and indicates the level of an
organization's reliance on volunteers versus paid staff members. The second proxy is the
amount spent on salaries, normalized by dividing by the total expenses for the year,
indicating the level of importance placed on the management and professionalization of
the organization (Hwang & Powell, 2009). The final proxy to measure
professionalization was the amount the organization spends on training, excluding
program-related training offered to clients.
Some organizations had anomalies in their reporting of the number of volunteers.
Specifically, the number of volunteers dropped to zero in some years, although they
reported a higher number in adjacent years. Due to the unlikelihood that there would be
that much variation from the years before and after, I replaced the 0 number with the
average of the years before and after. These adjustments were made for 53 tax returns.
Lobbying. Lobbying is computed by determining the amount spent on lobbying
or travel and entertainment for elected officials at local, state, and federal levels (Suárez
& Hwang, 2008).
Organizational stigma. Organizational stigma relies on NTEE codes related to
serving persons with mental disabilities (Feldman & Crandall, 2007) and crime-related
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causes (Rasmusen, 1996). Limiting it to these categories focuses on those stigmas
associated with being potentially dangerous (Goffman, 1963), which is an extreme case
to analyze the effects of organizational stigma better.

4.3.4 Control Variables
RDT research typically investigates five categories of management practices
(Hillman et al., 2009). These include mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures, boards,
lobbying, and executive succession. As this paper considers strong governance practices
and lobbying as variables of interest, I control for mergers and acquisitions, joint
ventures, and executive succession with proxy variables on IRS Form 990. While
uncommon in the nonprofit sector, mergers and acquisitions are captured by four
questions regarding whether the organization owns or is related to another organization.
Another management practice suggested by RDT to manage external dependencies is
related to pursuing joint ventures. (Wry et al., 2013). Scholars have found that when
social enterprises are engaged in partnerships where the power distribution is unequal,
they have an increased likelihood to drift from the social mission that the organization
initially stated (Kwong et al., 2017). This is consistent with the prediction of the resource
dependence perspective that powerful partners may have the ability to affect decisionmaking within a firm (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), including mission drift. Due to this
potential relationship, this paper controls for joint ventures through a proxy variable
which indicates whether the organization conducts more than 5% of its programs via an
unrelated organization. Executive succession is another management practice from RDT
that reduces resource dependencies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). This was captured
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through a proxy variable related to whether the board has created a succession plan for
the CEO or other key organizational leaders, which captures board involvement in
succession decisions.
Other variables that may affect results, and were therefore controlled for, include
geographic location, primary purpose, size, and age. Geographic location would likely
affect both operating expenses and ease of raising funds. Data regarding the state was
available in the IRS Form 990 data. I used categories from the US Census to assign these
to the four major regions of the country. NTEE Codes represent the primary purpose of
nonprofit organizations and are included in the NCCS Core Files. Some subsectors are
more established than others, so they likely have more established practices and higher
professionalization levels (Hwang & Powell, 2009). Therefore, to control for potential
differences between subsectors associated with subsector, I included a control for the
'Major Subsector' of the NTEE code, which designates charities into five sectors: Arts,
Education, Health, Human Services, and Other.
There are three primary reasons to control for the age of the organization. First,
research in the microfinance industry has suggested mission drift may occur in some
phases of the life cycle more frequently than others (Mia et al., 2019). Next, researchers
have also proposed that the needs of firms related to resources and monitoring might
change based on the life stage of the firm and the institutional environment (Garg, 2013).
Additionally, as organizations age and the founders and original directors retire, the new
directors may be more likely to drift away from the donor's original intent (Howard,
2007; Jones, 2007). Therefore, age is also controlled for and is computed based on IRS
Form 990 data indicating the year nonprofit tax status was granted. In cases where data
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was unavailable from the IRS, age was based on the date of incorporation reported by the
relevant state agency. It is computed by subtracting the founding year from the reported
tax year for the tax return. In addition, age-squared is included in the model to capture
any potential non-linear relationships between age and the other variables in the study.
Additionally, the size of an organization can affect the way a firm operates and
the decisions the leaders make regarding the future of the organization. In addition, larger
organizations may be better able to balance potentially disparate goals, as is the case in
strategic management research related to exploitation versus exploration (Uotila et al.,
2009). Therefore, size (measured as the organization's total assets) is used as a control.
Due to the skewed nature of assets, I used log_assets.

4.4 Analysis
In selecting the appropriate analysis, I have considered both the amount of
variability in the data and the influence that organizational characteristics not collected in
the study might have on the occurrence of mission drift. First, there are two variables in
the model that are time-invariant, specifically those related to organizational stigma.
However, they were only included as interaction terms, so the model still meets the
assumptions for fixed-effects analysis. Also, there are likely time-invariant characteristics
unique to each organization that might influence the incidence of mission drift. These
characteristics might include the level of education of the executive director and board,
the amount of time that an executive director has been at an organization, or the
organizational/reporting structure of the managers for activities related to incomeproducing activities and program-related activities. Using archival panel data limits the
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ability to gather additional data, so I used a fixed-effects panel regression approach to test
the hypotheses to control for these effects. I first ran a model using only the controls, then
added variables to test each additional hypothesis.

4.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter has outlined the proposed methods this dissertation will incorporate
to collect data and test the hypotheses outlined in chapter 3. It started by outlining the
data that was collected from IRS tax data and the NCCS. The chapter continued by
describing the variables to be used. It then provided an overview of the proposed method
for data analysis, primarily using panel analysis.
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS

Data analysis will attempt to answer three general research questions. First, how
does funding source affect mission drift? Next, which management practices help to
manage mission drift? Finally, how does organizational stigma affect the relationship
between revenue source and mission drift?

5.1 Computing Variables
5.1.1 Mission Drift, Textual Analysis
My processes and dictionaries for the textual analysis are based on Moss and
associates (2018) work that identifies words in narrative descriptions of crowdfunding
ventures that reflect either a social or economic orientation. Table 7 provides the word
lists they developed. In my paper, these terms serve as the basis to determine if the
organization's value orientation shifted from creating social value to economic value. The
dataset of mission statements was input into LIWC, which then returned a numeric score
based on the occurrence of words in the word lists divided by the total words in the
mission statement. That number is then standardized based on 100 words, resulting in a
number comparable across organizations, regardless of the length of the mission
statement. Scaling ensures that longer mission statements, which would naturally have
more opportunities to use social or economic words, do not receive higher scores.
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Table 7: Dictionaries for Textual Analysis
Orientation
Words used in LIWC custom dictionaries
Economic

affluen*, asset*, buy*, capital, cash, client*, contract*, cost*, cost-effective, customer*,
earn*, economic*, economy, efficien*, employ*, expan*, fee, fees, financ*, fund*, grew,
grow*, high-yield, hire*, hiring, income, interest, invest*, job*, lend*, livelihood, loan*,
market*, monetary, money, money-saving, money-transfer, output, paid, pay*,
performance, producti*, profit*, prosper*, purchas*, renovat*, rent, rental*, rented,
renting, rents, repaid, repay*, return, revenue*, rich*, salar*, sale*, saving*, shareholders,
sold, staff*, stipend*, transact*, turnover*, valuation, wage*, wealth, work*, worth, yield*

Social

Social: accountable, benefice*, beneficiar*, benefit*, benevolen*, brotherhood, care*,
caring, charit*, civic, class, classes, communit*, compassion*, concern, concerned,
cooperat*, cultivating, development, educat*, empower*, equal, equality, familial, families,
family, freedom*, graduation, happiness, happy, harmony, harvesting, harvests, health*,
help*, humanity, humankind, immuniz*, independen*, joy, justice, kind*, learn*, liberat*,
liberty, life, mankind, partnership*, peace*, prosper*, reading, responsibilities, rights,
social, societ*, SROI, success, support*, teach*, tender*, trustworth*, virtu*, welfare,
wellbeing, well-being, wisdom

* The root and its variants were used.

In theory, raw economic and social orientation scores range from 0 to 100,
although in my data the highest score for economic orientation was 66.67, as shown in
Table 8. Based on Moss and associates (2018) work, I then created an economic/social
balance score by subtracting the social orientation score from the economic orientation
score. For instance, one organization states that its mission is to "organize and mobilize
cancer survivors and supporters to raise awareness and funds for the fight against breast
cancer and to help find a cure." Based on the word lists, LIWC assessed this
organization's economic value orientation score as 4.17 (based on 'funds' in the text) and
their social value orientation score as 8.33 (based on 'help' and 'supporters'). Therefore,
the economic/social balance score would be 4.17, indicating that the organization is more
oriented towards social value creation. This score was used as the dependent variable.
Theoretically, the full spectrum of scores for the economic/social balance would range
from -100 to +100, with higher scores implying a greater focus on an economic value
orientation and lower scores indicating a higher social value orientation. In my sample,
the scores ranged from -100 to 66.67.
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Table 8: Economic and Social Value Orientation Scores
Variable
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
Economic
8,359
2.28
4.72
Social
8,359
6.80
7.31
Economic/Social Balance
8,359
-4.52
9.02

Min
0
0
-100.00

Max
66.67
100.00
66.67

5.1.2 Revenue Source
Commercial revenue was reported on 512 tax returns, and government funding
was reported on 3,223 tax returns. For ease of analysis and presentation, the original
values were divided by 1,000. Two organizations reported commercial revenue
significantly higher than total revenue in more than one year. Therefore, I dropped these
two organizations from the sample. To compute the level of influence that each source of
revenue might hold over the organization, I created a ratio that represents the portion of
total revenue received from the given funding source (a score of 0.14 indicates that the
organization receives 14% of total revenue from the indicated funding source).
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Table 9: Variables, Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Revenue
Government Funding
Commercial Revenue
Governance
990 Shared with Board
Audit Committee
Audit Performed
Independent Board Members Ratio
Family Relationships in Leadership
Conflict of Interest Policy
Whistle Blower Policy
Management not outsourced
Bonds indicated
Endowment indicated
Professionalization
Employees
Volunteers
Employee to Volunteer Ratio
Employee to Volunteer Ratio (Log)
Salaries to Expenses Ratio
Training to Expense Ratio
Employee to Volunteer Ratio,
standardized
Salaries to Expenses Ratio,
standardized
Training to Expense Ratio,
standardized
pro_index
Lobbying
Lobbying (direct)
Lobbying (travel)
Lobbying, total
Lobbying to Expenses Ratio
Organizational Stigma
Stigma, mental health
Stigma, crime-related
* in thousands

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

8,296
8,295

0.14
0.01

0.27
0.64

0.000
0.000

1.00
1.00

8,359
8,359
8,359
8,169
8,359
8,359
8,359
8,359
8,359
8,359

0.73
0.52
0.53
0.93
0.86
0.69
0.52
0.93
0.03
0.13

0.44
0.50
0.50
0.23
0.35
0.46
0.50
0.26
0.16
0.34

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

8,359
8,359
8,359
8,359
8,329
8,329

54.02
313.27
12.07
0.82
35.15
0.12

200.02
2716.02
66.31
1.31
27.55
0.59

0
0
0.00
0.00
-1.62
-0.01

4215
85000
1,479.00
7.30
98.31
16.68

8,359

0.000

1

-0.629

4.961

8,329

0.000

1

-1.335

2.293

8,329
8,329

0.000
0.001

1
0.639

-0.232
-0.724

27.859
8.652

8,359
8,359
8,359
8,329

1753.621
42.806
1796.427
0.001

33597.390
1394.856
33628.200
0.015

-150.00
0.00
-150.00
-0.004

2,066,167
103,516
2,066,167
0.998

8,359
8,359

0.038
0.018

0.192
0.133

0
0

1
1

5.1.3 Management practices
Strong governance practices. As mentioned in section 4.3.3 strong governance
practices are measured by several different proxies related to board monitoring,
independence of key individuals, tone at the top, and capital provider oversight. Factor
analysis was performed on these items to obtain a single score. The proxies for Board
Monitoring are whether the governing body received a copy of the IRS Form 990 before
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it was filed, whether the organization had an audit committee, and whether an audit was
completed by an independent accountant (coded "1" for yes and "0" for no). The three
proxies for Independence of Key Individuals are (1) a ratio that compares independent
board members to the total number of voting board members; (2) whether family or
business relationships exist between board members and the organization (reverse coded,
"1" indicates that no family or business relationships exist, indicating a higher level of
board independence); and (3) whether the organization has officially adopted a conflict of
interest policy (coded "1" for yes and "0" for no). The two proxies for Tone at the Top are
whether the organization has a whistleblower policy and whether management duties
have not been contracted to an outside party (coded "1" for yes and "0" for no). The two
proxies for Capital Provider Oversight are whether the organization has municipal bond
investors, temporarily restricted funds, permanently restricted funds, or endowments
(coded "1" for yes and "0" for no).
Table 10: Tetrachoric correlation matrix for strong governance variables
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1 Bonds Indicated
1
2 Endowments
Indicated
0.32
1
3 Conflict of
interest policy
1.00
0.33
1
4 Audit
0.71
0.36
0.61
1
5 990 shared with
board
0.24
0.18
0.42
0.31
1
6 Whistleblower
policy
0.52
0.29
0.91
0.66
0.44
1
7 Audit Committee
0.67
0.36
0.61
0.92
0.32
0.64
1
8 Family members
in leadership
0.09
-0.04
0.01
0.00
-0.16
0.02
0.00
9 Management not
outsourced
-0.36
0.10
-0.20
-0.37
-0.14
-0.07
-0.34
10 Government
Funding Indicated
-0.06
0.16
0.24
0.47
0.16
0.31
0.39
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8

9

10

1
-0.02

1

0.09

0.00

1

Dimension reduction. As nine of the ten variables related to strong governance
practices are dichotomous variables, I used a tetrachoric correlation matrix for factor
analysis (see Table 10). Since Bonds indicated is perfectly correlated with Conflict of
interest policy, I dropped Bonds indicated. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling
adequacy (KMO) was under .70, the minimum recommended for factor analysis, with
two items (Family members in leadership and Management not outsourced) having
scores less than .40. After dropping those two items, the KMO was 0.74, indicating that it
was appropriate to proceed with factor analysis. Just one factor was extracted with an
eigenvalue greater than 1, which accounted for 75.84% of the total variance (eigenvalue
= 3.63). Both the scree test and the parallel analysis also suggested one factor.
A factor structure coefficient of .40 is considered significant (Pituch & Stevens,
2016) in interpreting the factors in this study. Six of the seven remaining items had
factor structure coefficients of .40 or greater on Factor 1. The final item had a factor
loading of .39 and was retained. Those items are listed in Table 11. The items reflected
strong governance; thus, the factor was named 'strong governance.'
Table 11: Factor Loadings, Governance Practices
Variable
Factor1
Endowments Indicated
0.3902
Conflict of Interest Policy
0.8471
Audit
0.8875
990 shared with Board
0.4311
Whistleblower policy
0.8755
Audit Committee
0.8718
Government Funding Indicated
0.4136

Professionalization. As covered in section 4.3.3, the first proxy is the ratio of
paid staff to volunteers [staff/(volunteers+1)]. Adding 1 to the number of volunteers
ensures that a valid number will be calculated, even if no volunteers were reported on the
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tax return, eliminating undefined numbers. Following the example of Sanzo-Perez and
associates (2017) and based on the skewness of the distribution, I log-transformed this
variable, again adding 1 to ensure that no undefined values were created [log(ratio+1)].
The second proxy was the amount spent on salaries, normalized by dividing by the total
expenses for the year and multiplying by 100 to normalize the values. The final proxy to
measure professionalization is the amount the organization spends on training for staff,
excluding program-related training.
To create an index score that combines the three variables, I standardized each
item based on their z-scores and computed an average of the three values. A higher
number indicates a higher level of professionalization in the organization than in other
organizations in the sample.
Lobbying. Lobbying includes funds spent on lobbying for travel and
entertainment for elected officials at local, state, and federal levels. There were 492 cases
in the sample where organizations reported lobbying expenses on the IRS Form 990.

5.1.4 Organizational Stigma
Organizational stigma was based on NTEE codes that correspond to serving
persons with mental disabilities and crime-related causes (coded as "1", indicating the
organization served the audience indicated, or "0" indicating that they did not). There
were 319 tax returns of organizations addressing mental health needs and just 150 tax
returns indicating that the organization addressed crime-related issues.
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5.1.5 Controls
Considering the elements of RDT not included in this study, I controlled for
mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures, and executive succession with proxy variables.
Mergers and acquisitions was captured by four questions on IRS form 990 regarding
whether the organization owns, or is related to, another organization. This paper controls
for joint ventures by using a proxy variable indicating whether the organization
conducted more than 5% of its programs via an unrelated organization. Executive
succession is measured by whether the board created a succession plan for the CEO or
other key organizational leaders. Details for these variables are included in Table 12.
Table 12: Controls, Raw Data Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Obs
Mean
Mergers/Acquisitions, Q33
8,359
0.026
Mergers/Acquisitions, Q34
8,359
0.209
Mergers/Acquisitions, Q35
8,359
0.040
Mergers/Acquisitions, Q36
8,359
0.014
Mergers/Acquisitions Indicated
8,359
0.220
Joint Ventures, Q1
8,359
0.001
Joint Ventures, Q2
8,359
0.013
Joint Ventures Indicated
8,359
0.014
Succession Planning for CEO
8,359
0.515
Succession Planning, Other
8,359
0.343
Succession Planning Indicated
8,359
0.527

Std. Dev.
0.160
0.407
0.196
0.119
0.414
0.035
0.112
0.117
0.500
0.475
0.499

Min

Max
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Other variables that were included as controls were geographic location, primary
purpose, size, and age. 'Major Subsector' of the NTEE code, which designates charities
into five sectors (Arts, Education, Health, Human Services, and Other), was used to
control for potential differences between subsectors. I created dummy variables for each
of these sectors.
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Table 13: Major Subsectors
Major Subsector Frequency
Arts
989
Education
576
Health
1,158
Human Services
3,560
Other
2,079

A table with ages is included in Addendum A. Additionally, the size of an
organization can affect the way a firm operates and the decisions the leaders make
regarding the future of the organization. Therefore, size, measured by the value of assets
the organization holds, was used as a control. Due to the skewed nature of assets, I used a
log transformed variable of assets.
Although I intended to use a Herfindahl index, the variables in the data resulted in
values outside the theoretical range of expected values. The computed Herfindahl score
was higher than 1 in 301 cases. Therefore, I did not include this variable in the analysis.
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5.2 Data Quality
Panel descriptive statistics are provided in Table 14.
Table 14: Panel descriptive statistics
Variable
Mean
Mission Drift,
overall
-0.02
change in focus
between
within
Commercial
overall
0.01
Revenue, ratio
between
within
Government
overall
0.14
Funding, ratio
between
within
Lobbying
overall
0.00
Expenses, ratio
between
within
Professionalization overall
0.00
Index
between
within
Strong
overall
0.63
Governance
between
Practices
within
Organizational
overall
0.04
stigma, serves
between
mental health
needs
within
Organizational
overall
0.02
stigma, serves
between
crime-related
needs
within
Mergers or
overall
0.22
acquisitions
between
within
Joint ventures
overall
0.01
between
within
Succession plans
overall
0.53
between
within
Purpose: Arts
overall
0.12
between
within
Purpose:
overall
0.07
Education
between
within
Purpose: Health
overall
0.14
between
within
Purpose: Human
overall
0.43
Services
between
within

Std. Dev.
2.79
1.07
2.62
0.64
0.25
0.59
0.27
0.24
0.10
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.64
0.58
0.27
0.43
0.41
0.12
0.19
0.19

Min
-94.44
-10.49
-83.97
0.00
0.00
-7.23
0.00
0.00
-0.75
0.00
0.00
-0.17
-0.72
-0.70
-3.71
0.00
0.00
-0.17
0.00
0.00

Max
107.69
21.54
86.13
56.61
7.52
49.10
1.00
1.00
1.04
1.00
0.17
0.83
8.65
4.24
6.10
1.14
1.14
1.33
1.00
1.00

Tax Returns
N = 7284
n = 961
T-bar = 7.58
N = 8295
n = 959
T-bar = 8.65
N = 8296
n = 959
T-bar = 8.65
N = 8329
n = 960
T-bar = 8.68
N = 8329
n = 960
T-bar = 8.68
N = 8359
n = 961
T-bar = 8.70
N = 8359
n = 961

0.02
0.13
0.13

-0.86
0.00
0.00

0.74
1.00
1.00

T-bar = 8.70
N = 8359
n = 961

0.02
0.41
0.39
0.12
0.12
0.10
0.06
0.50
0.48
0.15
0.32
0.32
0.02
0.25
0.25
0.02
0.35
0.34
0.04
0.49
0.49
0.05

-0.88
0.00
0.00
-0.69
0.00
0.00
-0.82
0.00
0.00
-0.38
0.00
0.00
-0.74
0.00
0.00
-0.65
0.00
0.00
-0.75
0.00
0.00
-0.27

0.73
1.00
1.00
1.13
1.00
1.00
0.92
1.00
1.00
1.44
1.00
1.00
0.82
1.00
1.00
0.93
1.00
1.00
0.97
1.00
1.00
1.20

T-bar = 8.70
N = 8359
n = 961
T-bar = 8.70
N = 8359
n = 961
T-bar = 8.70
N = 8359
n = 961
T-bar = 8.70
N = 8359
n = 961
T-bar = 8.70
N = 8359
n = 961
T-bar = 8.70
N = 8359
n = 961
T-bar = 8.70
N = 8359
n = 961
T-bar = 8.70
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Variable
Purpose: Other
Assets (log)
Age
Age2
Tax Year

overall
between
within
overall
between
within
overall
between
within
overall
between
within
overall
between
within

Mean
0.25
13.55
30.47
1535.74
2015.11

Std. Dev.
0.43
0.43
0.05
2.22
.07
0.86
24.64
24.15
2.88
2996.00
2892.73
247.56
2.83
0.96
2.71

Min
0.00
0.00
-0.58
0.00
0.00
0.14
0.00
2.00
4.38
0.00
6.00
-969.56
2010
2012
2009.25

Max
1.00
1.00
1.14
20.08
19.88
19.90
162.00
157.00
52.37
26244.00
24659.00
5025.04
2020
2018
2020.86

Tax Returns
N = 8359
n = 961
T-bar = 8.70
N = 8352
n = 961
T-bar = 8.70
N = 8359
n = 961
T-bar = 8.70
N = 8359
n = 961
T-bar = 8.70
N = 8359
n = 961
T-bar = 8.70

Multicollinearity. Table 15 includes a between correlations table, VIF scores, and
tolerance values (1/VIF) of the explanatory variables in my model. None of the
correlations are greater than 0.80, indicating that multicollinearity should not be an issue
(Gujarati & Porter, 2009). Additionally, variance inflation factors (VIF) were all less
than 10, supporting that multicollinearity is not an issue (Allison, 1999).
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Table 15: Between Correlations Table

5.3 Main Findings, Panel Regression Tests Results
To test my hypotheses, I conducted a fixed-effects panel regression in Stata
through a series of five models. First, to determine which analysis method to use, I
conducted a Hausman test and a Breusch-Pagan test based on the full model.
Theoretically, a fixed-effects approach would be most appropriate, as there are several
time-invariant characteristics at the organizational level that may affect the independent
variables in this model. For instance, the personal characteristics of board members and
the leadership team would likely be associated with the organization’s professionalization
and strong governance practices (Parker, 2007). A fixed-effects model helps to control
for both the time-invariant characteristics of the organizations and any unobserved
heterogeneity (Allison, 2009). A Hausman test comparing a fixed-effects model with a
random-effects model was significant (p <.01), confirming that a fixed-effects model was
appropriate. A Breusch-Pagan test was statistically significant (p <.01), indicating that
heteroskedasticity in the data was a concern. Therefore I added robust standard errors to
help compensate for this unequal variance of error terms. Because a fixed-effects model
includes all time-invariant organizational effects in a single idiosyncratic error term, I
dropped the time-invariant variables from my model to avoid multicollinearity between
these variables. These variables included the direct effects of organizational stigma and
the controls related to geography and purpose.
Table 16 provides details regarding this analysis. The first model includes the
dependent variable and controls only. To test hypotheses 1 and 2, the second model adds
in commercial revenue and government funding. The third model tests hypotheses 3
through 5 and considers the interaction effects of funding source and management
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practice on mission drift. Model 4 focuses on the interaction effects of commercial
revenue and organizational stigma on mission drift. Finally, Model 5 presents the full
model. The F tests show that none of the models were statistically significant, meaning
that not all of the estimated coefficients in the model were different from zero and that
the models do not fit the data well.
As a baseline, Model 1, using a fixed-effects (within) regression, includes only
the controls and the dependent variable. Although the results are not statistically
significant, strong governance practices, mergers/acquisitions, joint ventures, and
succession policies led to an increase in social value orientation within my sample.
Higher levels of professionalization, lobbying, and assets were associated with higher
levels of economic value orientation, as indicated by changes in mission statements.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 predicted that commercial revenue and government funding
would be associated with higher levels of mission drift, respectively. Results are provided
in Model 2. Hypothesis 1 was not supported (β < 0.01, p = .26), indicating that an
increase in commercial revenue is not associated with an increase in mission drift. There
was also no support for Hypothesis 2 (β = .01, p =.99).
Hypotheses 3 through 5 (tested in Model 3) predicted that management practices
would result in increased levels of mission drift due to the organizations operating in a
resource-constrained environment, thereby straining all aspects of organizational
management. Hypothesis 3 is related to the interaction between strong governance
practices and commercial revenue. In addition to this relationship not being supported (β
= -1.37, p = .19), the sign was also different from that I had hypothesized, as the mission
statements' social value orientation increased. Hypotheses 4a and 4b were related to the
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interaction of (1) professionalization and commercial revenue and (2) professionalization
and government revenue. Neither coefficient was statistically significant, but both were
in the direction I had hypothesized within my sample. Both the interaction of
professionalization and commercial revenue (β = -0.65, p = .23) and professionalization
and government revenue (β = 0.11, p = .85) were associated with a slight increase
economic value orientation. Hypothesis 5 suggested that the interaction of lobbying and
government funding would lead to an increase in the incidence of mission drift. Again,
this was not statistically significant; however, in my sample, there appeared to be a slight
increase in the incidence of mission drift where organizations receiving government
funding also engaged in lobbying (β = 0.30, p = .90).
Hypothesis 6 predicted that organizations with commercial revenue combined
with organizational stigma would have a lower incidence of mission drift. While there
was evidence in my sample that this was the case (as shown in Model 5 in Table 16), it
was not supported to a level that was statistically significant. Both organizations serving
those with mental health needs (β = -25.10, p = .89) and those with crime-related issues
(β = -0.91, p = .46), in the context of commercial revenue, experienced less mission drift,
and instead increased their social value orientation. In summary, none of the hypotheses
were supported at a statistically significant level.
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Table 16: Panel Regressions
Model 1
Coef.
P>t
Commercial Revenue
Government Funding
Governance Practices x Comm Rev
Prof x Commercial Rev
Prof x Gov Funding
Lobbying x Gov Funding
Mental Health x Commercial Rev
Crime x Commercial Rev
0.704
Governance Practices
-0.199
Professionalization
-0.048
Lobbying
0.262
Mergers/Acquisitions
0.078
Joint Ventures
0.086
Succession policies
-0.068
Assets (log)
-0.120
Tax Year 2011
-0.155
Tax Year 2012
-0.431
Tax Year 2013
-0.460
Tax Year 2014
-0.308
Tax Year 2015
-0.207
Tax Year 2016
-0.277
Tax Year 2017
-0.221
Tax Year 2018
-0.143
Tax Year 2019
-0.010
Age
0.000
Age squared
-3.283
_cons
Tax Returns
Organizations
R-square
within
between
overall
corr(u_i, Xb)
F
Prob > F
sigma_u
sigma_e
rho

0.003 0.261
0.009 0.987

0.205
0.116
0.957
0.640
0.824
0.796
0.166
0.379
0.244
0.060
0.041
0.201
0.393
0.255
0.386
0.422
0.843
0.574
0.004
8,322
960

(18,959)

Model 2
Coef.
P>t

0.700
-0.196
-0.047
0.264
0.076
0.133
-0.068
-0.121
-0.153
-0.429
-0.460
-0.308
-0.206
-0.285
-0.229
-0.144
-0.011
0.000
-3.300

0.212
0.126
0.959
0.639
0.828
0.691
0.177
0.380
0.254
0.063
0.043
0.204
0.397
0.245
0.370
0.422
0.843
0.584
0.004

Model 3
Coef.
P>t

0.294
0.015
-1.367
0.652
0.112
0.299

0.707
-0.210
-0.233
0.264
0.073
0.130
-0.068
-0.120
-0.152
-0.429
-0.458
-0.305
-0.205
-0.285
-0.229
-0.143
-0.011
0.000
-3.308

8,280
959

0.003
0.003
0.003
0.003
0.004
0.003
0.046
-0.047
1.02 (20,958)
0.96 (24,958)
0.44
0.51
8.51
8.52
3.42
3.43
0.86
0.86
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0.182
0.979
0.192
0.228
0.850
0.898

0.208
0.161
0.919
0.638
0.834
0.697
0.178
0.391
0.260
0.065
0.044
0.208
0.400
0.247
0.373
0.427
0.842
0.586
0.004
8,280
959

Model 4
Coef.
P>t

0.003 0.260
0.008 0.988

-25.104
-0.909
0.700
-0.196
-0.047
0.264
0.076
0.134
-0.068
-0.121
-0.153
-0.430
-0.460
-0.308
-0.207
-0.286
-0.230
-0.144
-0.011
0.000
-3.300

0.894
0.462
0.212
0.126
0.959
0.639
0.828
0.689
0.177
0.380
0.254
0.063
0.043
0.204
0.396
0.245
0.370
0.420
0.843
0.584
0.005

Model 5
Coef.
P>t

0.298
0.014
-1.387
0.662
0.110
0.296
-23.620
-1.331
0.708
-0.210
-0.231
0.264
0.073
0.131
-0.068
-0.120
-0.153
-0.429
-0.458
-0.305
-0.206
-0.285
-0.229
-0.143
-0.011
0.000
-3.307

8,280
959

0.003
0.003
0.003
0.003
0.003
0.003
-0.047
-0.047
0.83 (22,958)
0.87 (26,958)
0.70
0.63
8.52
8.52
3.43
3.43
0.86
0.86

0.180
0.981
0.190
0.225
0.852
0.899
0.900
0.326

0.208
0.161
0.920
0.638
0.834
0.696
0.178
0.390
0.259
0.065
0.044
0.208
0.399
0.246
0.372
0.426
0.842
0.587
0.004
8,280
959
0.003
0.003
0.003
-0.047
0.77
0.79
8.52
3.43
0.86

5.4 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter presented details related to checking the data, computing variables,
confirming that assumptions for the analysis were met, and running the analysis. Section
Section 5.1 detailed how different variables were computed, including textual analysis of
the mission statements, revenue sources, management practices, organizational stigma,
and the controls. Section 5.2 provided information about the data quality checks. Finally,
Section 5.3 provided the results of the analysis.
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

6.1 Chapter Introduction
In previous chapters, I created a theoretical model that attempted to explain the
incidence of mission drift, outlined details to test that model, and provided the results of
those tests in Chapter 5. This chapter will reflect on those results, specifically presenting
possible reasons that none of the findings were statistically significant. In addition, I will
present implications and limitations and outline potential future research opportunities.

6.2 Reflection on Results
In this paper, I sought to explore under which circumstances mission drift occurs
in nonprofit organizations by answering three research questions. First, how does funding
source influence mission drift? Second, how do management practices affect the
relationships between funding source and mission drift? And third, what role does
organizational stigma play in the relationship between funding source and mission drift?
Although there were no significant findings in my study, many of the coefficients did
lean in the direction I had anticipated. In this section, I provide some potential reasons
that I may not have found significant results and reflect on the findings within the sample.
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6.2.1 Influence of Funding Source (H1, H2)
In previous chapters, I suggested that the influence of external funding sources
might distract organizations from their core mission, causing them to become more
focused on economic value creation. Specifically, I hypothesized that commercial
revenue and government funding would be associated with higher levels of mission drift.
These hypotheses were not supported. Although this is inconsistent with generally
accepted practice in the nonprofit sector and with some prior findings that increased
tensions would be associated with higher levels of drift (Civera et al., 2020; Doherty et
al., 2014), it is consistent with other studies that suggested there is not a relationship
between commercial funding and mission drift (Staessens et al., 2019; Yetman &
Yetman, 2009). There are a few reasons that a relationship might not be present in the
data. First, it could be that there is no relationship between the two variables and that
adding commercial streams of revenue may not put organizations at risk of mission drift.
Second, it might be that the variability in the sample was not sufficient to show an effect,
as there were just 132 organizations that reported commercial revenue in at least one
year. Third, it could be that operationalizing commercial revenue as unrelated business
income might be the wrong variable to consider, several types of program-related
revenue sources might be considered commercial revenue. Finally, it might also be that
any drift associated with pursuing commercial revenue happens when the decision to
pursue that revenue source occurs. Therefore it would technically occur prior to any
commercial revenue being collected. For instance, those types of decisions typically
occur as part of an overall strategic planning process, which could also include revisiting
the mission statement (Bryson, 2010).
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I also hypothesized that government revenue might be associated with higher
levels of mission drift, as the requirements of government grants, particularly related to
reporting and administrative requirements, may not be covered (Marwell & Calabrese,
2015). This hypothesis was also not supported. There are, again, several possible reasons
for this lack of significant findings. First, it might be that when organizations first seek
government funding, they are intentional about finding a match for their mission,
ensuring that no drift should occur. Second, It could be that the influence becomes salient
after the first grant is approved and prior to an additional grant. For instance, a healthrelated organization I worked at was often strongly encouraged by its grant officer (a
government employee who represents the government's interests to the organization) to
pursue additional grant opportunities (based on being a health care organization, rather
than considering the specific mission of the organization). A more nuanced look at first
versus subsequent government grants might help determine whether an effect is present
that might not be apparent when all organizations that receive government grants are
pooled together. Third, government grants are not the only source of government funding
that organizations receive. For instance, many healthcare organizations receive contracts
to provide care for the underserved. Those contracts are not captured under government
grants and are not readily available in the 990. That would require researching county,
state, and federal contract programs and manually tracking recipients. In summary,
neither pursuit of government funding nor commercial revenue was associated with an
increase in the amount of mission drift.
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Table 17: Summary of Hypotheses
Hypotheses
Beta
H1: Commercial Funding – Mission Drift (+)
H2: Government Funding – Mission Drift (+)
H3: Governance on Commercial – Mission Drift (+)
H4a: Professionalization on Commercial Revenue –
Mission Drift (+)
H4b: Professionalization on Government Rev to
Mission Drift (+)
H5: Lobbying on Government Revenue – Mission
Drift (+)
H6: Organizational Stigma on Commercial Revenue
– Mission Drift (-)

N=8280 (959 Groups)
Significant
0.003
Not Significant
0.009
Not Significant
-1.367
Not Significant
0.652
Not Significant
0.112

Not Significant

0.299

Not Significant

-25.104 (mental health)
-0.909 (crime)

Not Significant

6.2.2 Management Practices to Minimize Stakeholder Dependencies (H3, H4, H5)
Management practices did not appear to affect the relationship between the source
of revenue and mission drift to a statistically significant level in either direction. This is
contrary to expectations based on RDT (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and from the
hypotheses in this study. Although not statistically significant, the interaction of
commercial revenue and strong governance practices within my sample appeared to lead
to an increase in social value orientation. This might indicate that, at least for
organizations earning commercial revenue, RDT operates as Pfeffer and Salancik (1978)
anticipated, minimizing resource dependencies and allowing the organization to prioritize
its own goals.
Another finding in my sample that was not statistically significant is that the
interaction of professionalization and commercial revenue and the interaction of
professionalization and government funding resulted in a slight increase in economic
orientation. This is consistent with my hypothesis and might suggest that when
organizations focus on aspects of RDT, they do so at the risk of distracting from their
social mission.
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6.2.3 Organizational Stigma and Commercial Revenue
In Hypothesis 6, I suggested that organizational stigma would be associated with
lower levels of mission drift in the context of commercial revenue. The results were not
statistically significant. However, in my sample, the interaction between commercial
revenue and organizational stigma was associated with higher levels of social value
orientation. This means that not only did this group, on average, not experience mission
drift, but the interaction of commercial revenue and organizational stigma also resulted in
higher levels of mission focus.

6.3 Implications
There are theoretical and practical implications that might be drawn from my
study that are covered in-depth below. On a theoretical level, I suggest that RDT might
benefit from considering internal resource constraints and the effect that might have on
the effectiveness of management practices in minimizing external influences. Next, I also
suggest that concerns related to mission drift due to competing worldviews and donor
influence (primarily related to the introduction of commercial and government funding)
may be overstated. Then, I consider whether nonfinancial indicators might be relevant in
the context of RDT. My final theoretical contribution is to hopefully move one step
closer toward developing a theory of mission drift. In addition, I offer two practical
implications. First, I suggest that practitioners may not need to be as concerned about
mission drift when they consider adding commercial revenue. Next, I encourage
nonprofits to consider ways to build commitment to the cause to help protect against
mission drift.
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6.3.1 Theoretical
RDT in the Context of Internal Resource Constraints. In chapter one, I
suggested that RDT may not operate the same in organizations with internal resource
constraints. Although the findings of my study are inconclusive, in my sample, it
appeared that, in certain circumstances, management practices recommended by RDT led
to an increase in mission drift. For instance, organizations in my sample that received
government funding and were engaged in either lobbying or the professionalization of
their staff appeared to have a slightly higher rate of mission drift. Although this was not
statistically significant, it could indicate that investigating the effect of internal resource
constraints, as are present in nonprofit organizations, is warranted.
Competing Logics and Mission Drift. Hybridity literature theorizes that
attempting to operate under two different logics simultaneously will lead to increased
tensions and that those tensions may lead to favoring one logic over the other (Pache &
Santos, 2010). An institutional logic represents the assumptions (sometimes formally
introduced and, at other times, informally enforced) under which individuals and
organizations operate (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). Much of the research on this topic has
assumed that conflicting logics will cause mission drift (Smith et al., 2013). Therefore,
researchers have appeared to focus their efforts on identifying ways to balance these
logics (Battilana et al., 2015; Mason & Doherty, 2016). My findings do not indicate an
increase in mission drift (measured by value orientation of mission statements) associated
with commercial revenue (in the form of unrelated business income). There are a few
reasons this might be the case. Organizations that pursue commercial funding may have
already assessed whether they have the bandwidth to manage it. They may also engage in
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behaviors such as compartmentalizing, where organizations have distinct units that focus
on either commercial or social goals (Battilana et al., 2015).
The Role of Organizational Stigma. Social organizations that attempt to
generate commercial revenue may be at a disadvantage, as their stakeholders may not be
clear on how to categorize the organization. Organizational stigma may then add another
legitimacy challenge. On the surface, this double legitimacy challenge might be expected
to lead to an increased incidence of mission drift. The results of my analysis indicate that,
although there was some level of drift in my sample, it was not at a statistically
significant level. This indicates that there may be a missing factor that can help overcome
legitimacy challenges. It is possible that organizational stigma may result in stakeholders
having a higher level of commitment to the organizational goals and purposes, leading
those stakeholders to become even more committed to the cause rather than being
sidetracked when challenges arise.
RDT and Nonfinancial Indicators. Studies contributing to RDT have typically
measured financially driven outcomes. Since more companies are pursuing the creation
of shared value (Porter & Kramer, 2011), it could be helpful to understand whether RDT
still applies to nonfinancial outcomes. However, due to a lack of statistically significant
findings, my study was inconclusive. None of the management practices I tested,
including governance practices, professionalization, and lobbying, appeared to affect the
incidence of mission drift.
Towards a Theory of Mission Drift. Although I had hoped to move towards a
theory of mission drift, my results did not provide clear findings related to either source
of mission drift or ways to manage mission drift. Related to causes of mission drift, it

99

does not appear that commercial revenue nor government funding are associated with
higher levels of mission drift. As there was no drift to manage, considering the
effectiveness of management practices in managing that drift might be seen as fruitless.
However, the lack of support for mission drift caused by the presence of commercial
revenue might be informative in itself, in that it may tell us that we need to cast a wider
net as it relates to identifying precipitating causes of mission drift. In addition, the finding
that the commercial/social orientation of the organization did not change at a statistically
significant level when management practices from RDT were employed may mean that
those management practices did help manage that drift. Overall, however, it does appear
that an overarching theory of mission drift is a goal in need of further research.

6.3.2 Practical
Commercial Revenue and Mission Drift. Although nonprofit industry standards
suggest that pursuing commercial revenue might distract nonprofit organizations, my
results suggest this may not be the case. Over the last thirty years, nonprofit organizations
have increased their levels of professionalization, as evidenced by an increase in
associations serving professionals working within nonprofits, including board members,
organizational leaders, fundraisers, volunteer managers, grant writers, and program
managers. Perhaps this level of growth and professionalization helps to equip
organizations to balance the demands of both social and commercial goal pursuits.
Regardless, my study's lack of findings suggest that it might be possible to pursue
commercial revenue without risking the organization's social mission.
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Commitment to the Cause. Within my sample, organizational stigma appeared
to be associated with higher levels of social value orientation in organizations that
received commercial funding. One possible mechanism for this effect is that people
working in those agencies have a higher level of commitment than in other organizations.
Hudson and Okhuysen (2009) found that some of the bathhouses in their study sought out
suppliers and vendors known to be either stigmatized themselves or at least not worried
about potential negative repercussions of working with entities with organizational
stigma. This suggests that a network exists that might overlook the organizational stigma
and embrace the idea of challenging the stigma itself, thereby making "a virtue of their
insurrection" (Oliver, 1991). This seems likely, as people who align themselves with a
stigmatized group risk being stigmatized themselves (Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009).
Therefore, to be willing to accept that risk, they may need to have a strong commitment
to the cause. Practitioners might want to find ways to increase commitment to the cause
to mimic this possible moderating effect on mission drift.

6.4 Limitations
There are two primary limitations of my study I would like to highlight. The first
relates to the way I operationalized mission drift. The next considers limitations related to
using tax returns.
Measurement of Mission Drift. Although prior studies have used textual
analysis of mission statements (Lumpkin et al., 2013; Moss et al., 2018), this may not be
the best measure to use. There are a few reasons for that. First, some mission statements
can be quite short. In my sample, the mean word count is just under 31 words with a
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standard deviation of 26.3 words. The majority of mission statements are less than 40
words. While LIWC, the textual analysis software I used, compensates for the length of
the text by normalizing the score per 100 words, and while this has not been raised as an
issue in prior papers that used nonprofit mission statements, a general rule of thumb in
the psychology literature appears to be that a minimum of 25 to 50 words is suggested to
obtain accurate results (Boyd, 2017). This may limit the usability of this measurement.
Second, it takes effort on the part of organizations and their boards to change their
mission statements. Smaller organizations with higher internal resource constraints may
be least able to take the time and attention away from other issues at board meetings to
consider formally changing their mission statement. Finally, the incidence of drift, as
measured by textual analysis was quite small in the sample as their were only 350 cases
where the organization appeared to drift towards an economic orientation, and only 105
of those were at a level greater than a .5 standard deviation from the mean. This lack in
variability of the dependent variable may have affected the results.
Use of Tax Returns. There is value in working from an existing set of data,
primarily because it allows a larger number of years of data than would otherwise be
available. However, the granularity of the data is reduced, as measurements are limited to
those fields in the data. Three additional reasons using tax returns might be problematic
are as follows. First, the information provided on the return may not be fully accurate. A
bookkeeper or accountant, who may not be knowledgeable about the organization's
operations (including governance, operations, programs, and mission descriptions), is
typically assigned the tax of compiling the tax returns. Next, small start-up organizations
may not be included in the sample, as organizations are not required to file a complete
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990 (as opposed to the shorter 990EZ) until they reach $25,000 in annual revenues. Small
organizations are not the primary organization of interest in this study, but it is a
limitation that should be acknowledged. Finally, the dataset is limited to US
organizations, so its applicability to an international audience is limited.

6.5 Future Research Opportunities
I highlight several potential avenues for future research in this section. First, the
question of what constitutes a mission drift versus a strategic shift is a question that
remains outstanding in the literature. Next, although my research did not find a
relationship between government funding and mission drift, there may be conditions
under which they might be associated. Finally, using longer narrative descriptions to
measure drift, focusing on specific segments of the population, and considering the
organization's life stage are other approaches that could be interesting to explore.
Is it drift or shift? Although this paper presents mission drift as a negative
phenomenon, there are cases when changing course is better for the organization and the
cause to which it is committed. Adjusting the mission might help the organization focus
on the root problem the organization was founded to solve. For instance, many
organizations are attempting to solve 'wicked' problems, which may require that the
organization stay nimble and adapt to the challenges they face (Conklin, 2006; Rittel &
Webber, 1973). These ongoing adaptations should not necessarily be considered mission
drift. In addition, it may not be a tradeoff in that an increase in a commercial value
orientation might also lead to an increase in social value creation (Staessens et al., 2019).
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Impacts from the Introduction of Government Funding. Although this study
did not find a relationship between government funding and mission drift, there may be
an effect if one were to investigate whether a second federal grant would have more of an
effect. Perhaps the process of getting the first grant is intentionally focused on advancing
the organization's mission. In contrast, the second grant could directly result from
stakeholder influence, as the stakeholder (in this case, the government) would be more
salient after the first grant. Additional grants the organization might be strongly
encouraged to pursue might not be so closely related to the organization's mission.
Longer narratives to assess value orientation. Future research might consider
using longer narratives from annual reports or other annual reports to address the length
of mission statements. While not all organizations file annual reports, many established
organizations do. Therefore, these reports may provide additional insights into whether
these organizations have an economic versus social value orientation.
Focus on Specific Segments. There may be too much heterogeneity in the
sample, so it might be beneficial to consider whether some subsectors are more
susceptible to external influence than others. For instance, limiting the study to arts
organizations, community health centers, or other specific organization types may help us
better understand the nuance of the relationship between funding source and mission
drift. Because this study used fixed effects, those effects did not surface in this study.
Life Stage of Organizations. It might also be that the organization's life stage
would affect these relationships. Specifically, young organizations in their formative
years might be more likely to be swayed by external influences. The research on young
nonprofit organizations and how they avoid mission drift is quite limited. Only twelve
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articles in my literature review included age in their analysis, and none used it as a
variable of interest.

6.6 Conclusion
Despite the concerns of leaders in the nonprofit sector regarding mission drift,
results from research thus far have been inconclusive related to the sources of drift. For
instance, studies on whether commercial revenue leads to mission drift have had
conflicting results (Civera et al., 2020; Staessens et al., 2019), as has government funding
(Bennett & Savani, 2011; Berrett & Holliday, 2018). Not understanding the causes of
mission drift has made it difficult to know how to manage it. In addition, I suspect that
not accounting for the internal resource constraints typical of nonprofit organizations has
also caused challenges.
In this paper, I have used RDT to attempt to deconstruct some of the causes of,
and management practices for, mission drift within an internally resource-constrained
environment, specifically in my study within nonprofit organizations. I hypothesized that
management practices typically used to manage external stakeholder influence would not
operate the same in the nonprofit context due to limitations of administrative budgets and
time available by executives and volunteer boards.
I tested these relationships using a sample of 8,280 tax returns (from the years
2010 – 2021) representing 956 organizations. Although there were no statistically
significant findings in my study, the results from my sample might still inform two
primary implications. First, although my study found no statistically significant
relationships, the interaction between professionalization and both commercial revenue
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and government funding resulted in a slightly higher incidence of mission drift in my
sample. In addition, the interaction between lobbying and government funding was also
positive in my sample. This suggests that management practices recommended by RDT
to manage external influences may not operate the same in organizations with internal
resource constraints. In addition, the interaction between commercial funding and
organizational stigma resulted in higher levels of social value orientation in my sample.
This is in contrast to prior studies, which have suggested that both tensions related to
divergent worldviews (in this case, commercial revenue) and organizational stigma
increase the probability of mission drift. This suggests that more research may be needed
to understand these relationships fully.
Although there were no statistically significant findings in this study, the results
provide evidence that many of these relationships would benefit from further study. By
considering internal resource constraints combined with RDT, we may better understand
why the management practices suggest work in some cases and not in others.

6.7 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, I started by reflecting on the results of my analysis, including
several potential reasons my findings are inconclusive. Next, I presented some theoretical
and practical implications of those findings. This was followed by possible limitations of
my study, primarily the use of public tax return data and possible shortcomings with
using mission statements to determine value orientation. Next, I shared some ideas about
future research opportunities and provided some concluding thoughts on my study.
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Addendum A: Table of Ages
Age of Organization
0-9
10-19
20-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
60-69
70-79
80-89
90-99
100-109
110-119
120-129
130-139
140-149
150-159
160-169

Frequency
1154
2045
1777
1371
838
425
234
110
67
64
80
77
24
29
40
21
3

Percent
13.8%
24.5%
21.3%
16.4%
10.0%
5.1%
2.8%
1.3%
0.8%
0.8%
1.0%
0.9%
0.3%
0.3%
0.5%
0.3%
0.0%
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